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This thesis presents an implementation on how resources can be allocated in
robotic applications. The implemented system provides access control for movement
commands on robots utilizing the Robot Operating System (ROS) as the control
framework. The system ensures that unintentional movements cannot be executed
by unauthorized motion controllers. Each controller is isolated from the hardware
interface. This is enforced by a firewall monitoring internode ROS connections.
The system also provides control over the robot movement independent from the
controllers by stopping or slowing down the movements on the robot. This includes
configurable velocity and acceleration limits for the commands relayed to the
robot hardware. The independent control enables the system to handle faults by
constructing separate, reusable fault monitors, which can stop the movement on
the robot.
The developed middleware was configured for Care-O-bot 4 personal servant robot.
Example controllers and use cases were constructed to test and demonstrate the
capabilities of the system. A simulated robot was used to test hazardous examples,
such as extended robot arms colliding with walls during navigation. This was
resolved by constructing a fault monitor, which stopped the robot if arms were
close to a collision. The fault was resolved by folding the arms. The test was
successful as the default ROS navigation node was in control of the robot base
movement, but the system modified the relayed velocities and the arms did not
collide with the walls.
The middleware was proved on the real robot and the differences between the
simulated and real robots were insignificant for normal operation. The system
delivered the designed functionality.
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Tässä diplomityössä toteutetaan ja testataan robotin turvallisuutta parantava
järjestelmä. Toteutettu järjestelmä on tarkoitettu ROS ohjelmistolla toteutettuihin
robotteihin ja erottaa liikkeitä komentavan ohjelmiston ja robotin toimilaitteita
ohjaavat ajurit toisistaan. Se antaa vain yhden ohjelmiston kerrallaan komentaa
toimilaitetta ja täten varmistaa ettei epätoivottuja liikkeitä muilta ohjaimilta
voida suorittaa samanaikaisesti. Tämän varmistetaan ROS-komponenttien välisten
kommunikoinnin lukitsemisella käyttäen palomuuria.
Järjestelmä myös tarjoaa mahdollisuuden muokata liikekomentoja ennen niiden
toteutusta ja konfiguroitavissa olevat nopeus- ja kiihtyvyysrajoitukset suojelevat
käyttäjiä ja ympäristöä mahdollisilta vaaratilanteilta. Tämä myös mahdollistaa
ohjaimista riippumattomat pysäytys- ja hidastustilat, joita voidaan käyttää robot-
tiin kohdistuvien vikatilanteiden hallintaan. Näitä voidaan hyödyntää esimerkiksi
käyttämällä erillisiä vika- ja vaaratilanteita tunnistavia komponentteja robotin
toiminnan ohjaamiseen.
Kehitetty ohjelmisto konfiguroidaan Care-O-bot 4 palvelurobotille ja sen toimintaa
testataan ja demonstroidaan rakentamalla yksinkertaisia kontrollereita ja esimerk-
kitapauksia. Vaarallisten tilanteiden testaamiseen käytetään simulaatioympäristöä,
kuten tapausta jossa robotin kädet on ojennettu sivuille ja ne osuvat navigoin-
tiympäristön seinäelementteihin. Rakennettu tarkkailija estää käsien tormäämisen
pysäyttämällä robotin. Navigoinnin jatkamiseksi käsi komennetaan robotin rungon
lähelle ja robotin annetaan jälleen liikkua. Robotti pysäytettiin ja käden mahdolli-
nen törmäys estettiin, vaikka navigointikomponentti komensi robottia liikkumaan
koko toimenpiteen ajan.
Järjestelmä todettiin toimivaksi ja se pystyy suojelemaan robottia, ympäristöä ja
robotin kanssa työskenteleviä henkilöitä oikein käytettynä.
Avainsanat: ROS, automaatio, palomuuri, turvallisuus, palvelurobotiikka,
henkilökohtaiset robottiapurit, resurssienhallinta
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1 Introduction
The advancements in computing technology have increased the processing power
significantly. The transistor count on processors has been increasing as the fabrication
methods improve [1]. Moore’s law [2] has predicted this trend. The price of processing
power has also decreased and more powerful system can be gained for the same
amount of money as the technology advances [3]. Although Moore’s Law may not
fully apply anymore [4] the architectural advancements, miniaturization and power
efficiency have enabled more applications to have significant computing power at their
disposal. This combined with battery technology producing lighter and volumetrically
more efficient batteries [5] have led to a multitude of mobile applications.
One of such applications is mobile robotics, which covers multitude of different
platforms and objectives the robots must accomplish. Unlike industrial robots, which
are usually programmed to execute a single or a series of preprogrammed tasks in a
familiar environment, the mobile robots are working in dynamic surroundings. This
requires the robots to behave autonomously as their behaviour is not fixed and they
have a decisional layer directing the actions taken by the robot [6]. The research and
development in control software with integrated safety features have made interaction
with humans easier as the risks involved in human robot interaction (HRI) can be
identified and addressed autonomously [7].
The interaction between humans and mobile robots have led to assistive technologies
for improving the way of human life. Specifically in applications “which require close
human-robot interaction and collaborations, as well as physical human-robot contact”
[8] the personal care robots are used. Not all personal care robots are mobile [9], but
mobile platforms provide more variety for the tasks the robots can perform. The field
is not new as robots assisting humans in their everyday life have been built before.
For example the vacuum cleaning robots have emerged as successful commercial
applications from multiple manufacturers in the 2010s, but the earliest prototypes
for autonomous vacuum cleaners were introduced in 1991 [10].
Using machinery to serve and help humans is nothing new. In the 1920 play
“Rossum’s Universal Robots” the writer Karel Čapek used the word robot to describe
the manufactured, soulless workers. The word was developed from the Czech word
“robota” describing forced labour [11]. This gained ground and robots were used to
describe numerous biomechanical and mechanical servants in literature and movies.
Technology was not ready for such servant in the early 1900s, but later the industrial
robots started emerging. These were not serving humans as in the original works
and were limited to a set of preprogrammed tasks. The modern personal care robots
have started closing the loop. Some even have humanoid or animalistic features to
improve the interaction with humans [12]. This thesis focuses on the mobile personal
care robots, specifically on the mobile servant robot type of machines.
The multitude of different tasks such a platform can execute is immense. The robot
may be directed by a decisional layer, but the movements and sensory perception
2are handled by separate processes. Due to the diversity of the tasks, a single process
is unlikely to handle all the movements required for accomplishing the functionality.
As there are multiple controllers capable of commanding the hardware, there is a
possibility that a software error or misconfiguration can lead to situations where
the robot is performing unintended motions. This leads to issues as robots sharing
common space with humans must ensure that they are not endangering the personnel
interacting with the robot [8, 13].
This thesis aims to provide protection against this issue through a middleware
isolating the controllers from the hardware. This was to be implemented for a mobile
servant robot in possession of the Intelligent robotics group at Aalto University [14].
The robot is Care-O-bot 4 manufactured by Fraunhofer IPA [15] (Fraunhofer-Institut
für Produktionstechnik und Automatisierung) and it has a humanoid upper body
operating on a wheeled chassis. Multiple actuator options exist for the robot with
different drive systems, number of arms and articulating joints for the body. The
Care-O-bot 4-8 for the research group is outfitted with two arms, an omnidirectional
drive system and a 3 DOF (degrees of freedom) joint for the head. It is running
ROS [16] (Robot Operating System) Indigo as the operating system for robotic
applications. The system for the controller isolation needed to be implemented for
this environment. The existing controllers need to stay relatively unchanged so the
middleware cannot be inserted into the controllers themselves. Therefore the external
system was requested.
The main goal was to ensure that the controllers are not able interfere with the
hardware when they were not allowed to. Secondary goals were added later in the
development as the system started to form. It should be easy to use so researchers
and other users can incorporate it for their experiments without too much of difficulty.
The system should also be able to stop the movements of the robots in case of errors
or failures are detected in the robot or the monitored environment and provide a
way for resolving these situations.
All in all the system to be designed and implemented should be suitable for the
research group. Documentation on how the system works should be presented along
examples how the system can be utilized. Code examples should also be supplied so
the system can be easily utilized for future experiments.
This thesis is sectioned into 11 parts, which consist of five different categories. The
existing development is discussed first before the design of the system is explained.
The communication and the operation of the components the system consists of
are reviewed before the testing and example use cases are presented. Finally the
thesis is concluded by discussing the implemented system and its usability on robotic
platforms.
32 Requirements and existing development
The thesis was started by looking into previously developed solutions for ROS, which
could be utilized for the Care-O-bot 4 implementation. The basic requirements for
the system need to be known for evaluating the feasibility of the existing software
components. The different controllers, ROS nodes, needed to be isolated from
the hardware and an access control setup was needed for modifying the isolated
controllers. These were the critical requirement, which the system must accomplish.
Other requirements were added later as features were added during the system
development and they are listed in the following section.
2.1 Requirements
1. Maximum of one controller per hardware shall access it at a time.
2. The active controller shall be selectable.
3. The hardware interfaces should be protected from outside influence.
4. The commands to hardware should be limited to configurable maximum values.
5. The hardware should be stoppable independent of the active controllers.
6. The ongoing movements should be able to slowed down independent of the
active controllers.
7. The system should not allow unauthorized access modifications.
8. The system should provide recovery methods for faults.
9. The system should be configurable for multiple platforms.
10. The system should support multiple robots on shared environment.
2.2 Existing development
The acquired results for readymade components were not promising as other people
had asked the questions about ROS access control before. The closest answer was
the usage of firewall on the ROS TCP and UDP connections [17]. Another possible
solution was found with SROS. The third Secure ROS, which should not be confused
with SROS, was announced later when the implementation for thesis had been started,
but the provided features seemed similar to SROS so it was inspected.
2.2.1 SROS
SROS [18] is a security enhancement for ROS and it is proposed as an addition to
the ROS API for fixing the security vulnerabilities in ROS. It incorporates TLS
4(Transport Layer Security) into the communications used by ROS along other modern
cryptography and security measures. TLS is intended to protect the nodes from
network threats, even local ones, by encrypting the traffic between ROS components
with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Encryption ensures that the packets cannot
be redirected or replayed to cause harm on the robot by injecting actions into the
system. This is achieved by using the ROS client libraries to add the use of TLS
transport instead of the normal node communications [19]. This allows the existing
codebase to support SROS without modifications [20]. Currently the only supported
interface is the TCP transport layer when developed under Python with the rospy
[18] client library. The system also provides userspace tools for generating the node
key pairs for the encryption and access control policies. Other supporting components
are made to distribute these keys on system setup.
Access control is implemented through extensions on the PKI, but it is used for
restricting the access the node has. Namespaces and topics the node may subscribe or
publish into can be configured. The node may not increase its own privileges on the
system as the TLS handshakes on the connections would otherwise fail. Essentially
every connection is secured through the TLS and the permissions must match on
the key or the connection may not form.
SROS also goes on the kernel level restricting the process, the ROS node, access to
resources using the Linux Security Modules. This is to combat attacks on packages
used by the system. If a package has vulnerability that provides an attacker shell
access on the host system, it could lead to malicious actions on the system [20].
SROS is geared towards securing the system in a networked environment. The restric-
tion of nodes and namespaces could be useful, but the system does not implement
the basic idea behind this thesis and cannot switch authorized nodes publishing on a
topic dynamically. It is still in experimental stage and active development. Some of
the functionality and the tutorials are also missing. It is not suitable for the needed
access control system as it cannot statisfy the critical requirement 2 of dynamic
access control for the multiple controllers commanding the hardware. It does provide
the requirements 1, 3, 6, 9 and 10. SROS could be used along the developed system,
but the extensive configuration and lack of C++ support may cause issues.
2.2.2 Secure ROS
Secure ROS [21] replaces packages, such as the rosmaster, the C/C++ and Python
interfaces for ROS, with its own versions that support secure communications. It
does provide the functionality for restricting access on topics to allowed nodes, but
the connections are not dynamic and cannot be switched. The secure ROS relies on
configuration files to provide the publishers and subscribers which are allowed to
connect, which nodes are allowed to get and set ROS parameters and the authorized
requesters and providers for ROS services. If no configuration is loaded, the secure
ROS system behaves as ROS without any of the enhancements [22].
5Secure ROS accomplishes the functionality by securing the connections on IP (Internet
Protocol) level and IPsec (IP Security Architecture) ensures the IP addresses are not
spoofed [23]. This implementation also means that the connections on the topics,
services and parameters are only bound at IP level. The nodes themselves cannot be
addressed individually. The nodes are assigned to an IP address and then the IP
address may be configured for a topic. However if another node is configured for the
same IP address on some other topic, it may still connect to the first topic. The IP
addresses can be assigned through aliases, but the documentation is unclear if the
alias or the IP is used for the identifier. Most likely it is the IP address the alias
points to and therefore the nodes on same machine cannot be identified from each
other.
Both the C/C++ and Python client libraries are supported by Secure ROS, but it is
only intended for securing connections between different machines on the network.
The access control also cannot handle the switching so the system cannot be used
for the Care-O-bot 4 implementation. Only the requirement 9 and 10 are fulfilled,
while the requirement 1 is only applicable in special cases where each controller and
hardware run on different network interface.
63 System design
The upcoming system for safely isolating the controllers from each other needed
to be designed before implementation could be started. For the architecture to be
designed, the execution method of the main requirement, the access control, of this
thesis needed to be determined.
As the research indicated there were no known readymade components which could
be used to affect the data used for controlling the robot, a solution needed to be
developed. It is known from the provided simulation environment that the data is
passed through ROS topics with different messages depending on the interface, for
example geometry message Twist containing linear and angular velocities or trajectory
message JointTrajectory containing joint angles, velocities and accelerations. It was
also known that all internode communications are done through the network layer
by default with TCP packets and with UDP packets if requested [24]. The robot
runs on Ubuntu computers and therefore the iptables firewall solution can be used
to inspect the packets passing the data from one node to another. Using the firewall
method to switch between the inputs the existing configuration would not need
modifications and the access control could be added afterwards. Only the control
signals determining which controller has access to the hardware would need to be
added.
Another possible solution thought up was to create switchable multiplexers for each
message type. This solution would need individual topics for each controller and the
existing configuration needs to be remapped to accommodate the system along the
access control components.
3.1 Firewall testing
A simple shell script was written to test if connections from different nodes can
be identified, separated and blocked. If this could be done, the isolation of ROS
controllers from the hardware interfaces would be done by blocking packets on the
network layer and no specialized software is needed to adopt the isolation for different
ROS messages.
The “rostopic info” command provides connection information, including the hostname
and port number on the nodes publishing and subscribing to the specified topic. The
script lists the publishers on the topic and one of these need to be provided as the
node the script will block from connecting to the subscribers. The node name is
used to filter the network socket information of the local computer for the publisher
and the PID (process identifier) of the process are extracted. The script then uses
the socket information to get all the ports the process is listening on. These are
the source ports for the firewall as the messages originate from the publishers. The
PID and port extraction is repeated for the subscribers and the acquired ports are
the possible destination ports for the firewall rule. These two port groups are then
7matched together so the relevant send and receive parts are grouped and ports with
no matching pairs are discarded from the firewall rules. Finally the script reads the
process names for the PIDs and provides the user a clear message on the processes and
ports to be used for the firewall rules. If the user accepts the provided information,
the firewall rule is activated. Once the user wishes to remove the rule, the script will
delete it before exiting. The firewall rule is set to reject TCP packets with push flag
set so it only affects nodes using the normal ROSTCP connections.
3.1.1 Results
During the experimentation the ports used by topics delivering data had the PSH bit
when examined with tcpdump. When a node was not actively publishing messages,
the ports had ACK, acknowledgment, set and no data was flowing. These messages
turned out to be keepalive [25] messages. If these messages were blocked by the
firewall, the connection between nodes was immediately broken and the publisher
was observed to try retransmission of the packets. When only the packets with PSH
bit set are blocked by the firewall and the node was not publishing any messages
to the topic, the connection between nodes was observed to be stable up to six
hours at which point the experiment was stopped. After the firewall was deactivated,
publishing to the topic from the previously blocked node was not hindered and the
subscribers were immediately able see the messages.
The previously mentioned retransmission of packets can be observed immediately
when a message was published by the blocked node. The retransmission interval was
five seconds for the first four minutes, at which point it was increased to two minutes.
After total of 15 minutes the connection attempts stopped and the subscribers were
observed to be receiving messages from the blocked node. Inspecting the connections
from the nodes revealed that the publisher and subscriber had renegotiated the port
used for data transfer. If the firewall was deactivated during the retransmission
intervals, the next message passed to the subscribers would occur at the time of next
retransmission attempt even if the node was publishing new messages.
These observations disqualify the firewall from being used as the switch between
the hardware interface and the controllers. The switchover time between the inputs
would be uncertain, but up to two minutes, which is unacceptable for practical
applications, thus not fulfilling the requirement 2. The testing and observations were
not useless as the methods used were later developed into a firewall node protecting
the topics from unwanted publishers fulfilling the requirement 3.
3.2 Final design
The designed system consist of multiple components working together to provide a
controllable platform with controller isolation for the hardware. The original request
was to implement the system for the Care-O-bot used by the Intelligent Robotics
8group at Aalto University. Instead of building a robot specific platform, the system
was designed to be used with any robot using ROS with the same messages as the
Care-O-bot to control the action of the robot. By not binding to a single platform the
system should be usable on multiple robotic platforms, fulfilling the requirement 9.
The configuration for each robot is separated into ROS launch files, which bring the
system up as configured. The system was designated as ROSGuard as the combined
system can protect the robots under ROS from unwanted motions.
It was also acknowledged that the group researches robot co-operation [26] and the
system was built to support multiple instances running on different robots. All
configuration parameters and control topics used by the system can be configured to
be in specified ROS namespace, designated as the robot namespace. Each component
accepts a parameter called “robot” and it is used to designate the namespace the
control topics and parameters reside in, thus fulfilling the requirement 10. The control
topics are created into global namespace using the parameter provided. Therefore
the normal ROS naming standards [27] apply to the robot namespace.
The control methods used to control the robot may differ. During experiments the
robot may be running a single controller, which is being tested, or the robot is loaded
with multiple controllers and a task coordinator, such as SMACH [28]. The access
to the hardware resources for each controller need to be activated. To achieve this
the system has a central component serving as an interface for the client controllers
for the requirement 2. This component is the resource allocator. The controllers
themselves can request access from the allocator to the specified resources or the task
controller can do it so individual controllers do not need to be modified. In some
scenarios and with certain messages the controllers may not need to implement the
access reservations as the reservation can be automated by passing the movement
messages through a proxy. The proxy can do the access reservation based on the
output commands from the controller. The possible configurations are shown in
figure 3.1.
The allocator commands the multiplexers responsible of managing the hardware
interfaces. As the name implies, the multiplexers have multiple inputs and a single
output. The inputs are connected to client controllers and the output is connected
to the hardware interface. In the case of Care-O-bot the hardware have multiple
interfaces. The actuators can be commanded with multiple message types. For
example the arm actuators have five different hardware interfaces. To identify each
hardware interface the client controllers can reserve access to the topic or actionserver
by their name in the access reservation messages. This however only allocates the
one of the possibly multiple hardware interfaces to the client controller. The other
interfaces could be used to send conflicting commands to the actuators. This goes
against the goal of this thesis as the hardware can no longer be safe.
To rectify this issue each multiplexer node can be assigned to different groups. The
groups are used to assign each multiplexer on specific hardware to the relevant group.
For example all the five multiplexers on the left Care-O-bot arm are assigned to the
arm_left group. Using the group names during the access reservation the whole
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affected by any other controller. This fulfills the requirement 1. The grouping can
also be used to construct metagroups, groups containing multiple actuators. These
can be used to construct chains out of the actuators to be reserved in single request.
For example on Care-O-bot the left gripper can be included automatically in the
arm_left group as the two resources are likely to be used together. The configured
system for the Care-O-bot includes this modification and the other groups defined for
it are base, gripper_left. arm_right, gripper_right, head and sensorring. Using these
identifiers for the access reservation is more intuitive than the topic or actionserver
names.
By default the resources can only be reserved if they are not allocated to other
controllers and only the controller reserving the resources can relieve them. This
fulfills the requirement 7. An override functionality was implemented into the system.
Controllers overriding any resource must be ready to accept the robot in arbitrary
state. The original controllers are notified by the allocator that their access has been
revoked. The previously presented overlapping grouping also provides challenge to
the override functionality. It is possible to override a group, which takes partial
access from another controller. To prevent any controller from continuing execution
with partial resources, the allocator assigns the conflicting group to the overriding
controller. This was done to fulfill the requirement 8 as the overrides are intended to
be used for resolving faults.
Figure 3.1: System architecture.
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3.2.1 Additional features
The scope of the system was expanded as the approach using the firewall for control
switching was abandoned and the multiplexers were utilized to relay the messages
from the controllers. Each multiplexer was tailored for a specific message type.
Additional features could be included in the system by modifying the message before
passing it to the output. The robotic platform must not harm the humans interacting
with it. This can be implemented by restricting the forces the robot is able to exert
on the interacting humans to a safe level. The given robotic platform, Care-O-bot 4,
does not include any force sensors for controlling the actuators. Instead the system
is built to protect the robot and its users from excessive velocities and accelerations,
fulfilling the requirement 4. These can be classified as the safety-related speed limits
required by the ISO 13482:2014 [8] standard for the personal care robots. Reducing
the velocities reduces the risks of injuring other parties in the area the robot operates
in [29].
In addition to the configured limits, the system was also built to modify these limits
based on the operational state. By the requirement 5 and 6, the robot can be slowed
down or even stopped using the system. The stopping of the robot through the
multiplexers satisfy the IEC 60204-1 [30] category 2 protective stop if the proper
risk assessment and performance levels are met. The same goes for the automatic
restart by the control logic. The ROSGuard only provides the framework and the
assessment, detection and identification of risks on each platform is left for the end
user. The safety related speed control, the slowdown functionality, should be used
with caution as the current iteration of the system can meet the requirements only
with some of the messages used to move the actuators.
The control over the protective stop states and slowdown functionality were incor-
porated into a simplified fault message. The cause for the protective stop or the
safety-related speed control need to be identified. Unless the states are manually
triggered, the source for the mode changes are most likely the fault detection and
identification components embodied into the robot control software. The fault system
incorporated into the ROSGuard components is not intended to replace any of the
components used for fault detection or error recovery, but it is appointed as an easy
to use communication channel on the faults and their effects on the system. Usage
of the ROSGuard fault message is not mandatory if the protective stop functionality
is not needed. The safety related speed limits still apply as they are built in on the
multiplexer nodes.
3.3 Components
As defined previously, the ROSGuard system consists of two major components. The
resource allocator and the input multiplexers. Other components are the firewall,
fault message and the monitoring interface. These three are not vital to the basic
operation of the system. They however complete the system by providing services
11
and security. All of the components are written for ROS using the C/C++ interface
roscpp [31].
The resource allocator handles the access requests from the clients. The information
about which resources have been allocated is not stored by the allocator. The current
status is queried from the multiplexer nodes each time an access request is made.
Each robot may only have one allocator at the time and by not storing the information
the reliability of the system is increased. The allocator node may crash and respawn
or moved between computers without major effects on the operation of the robot.
The multiplexers handle the input switching for each of the hardware interfaces
and receive commands from the resource allocator. They also handle the protective
stop and speed control. To ensure proper configuration the nodes output debugging
information of the inputs and outputs. For example the number of publishers on
the hardware interfaces are monitored because the multiplexer nodes should not be
bypassed to ensure the controller isolation.
Firewall can be used to lock down the configured topics from future connections.
The intended purpose is to ensure the hardware interfaces cannot receive any other
messages than the ones relayed by the multiplexer. This could occur as software
not adapted for the ROSGuard system begin moving the robot through the original
control topics directly connected to the hardware.
The fault message is used to convey the state the multiplexers should operate in. It
can also be used by any other component as it can carry information on the events on
the robot. The intended purpose is for the client controllers to modify their operation
based on the events and possibly stop outputting commands in case the robot is
commanded to stop through the multiplexer protective stop.
The monitoring interface can be used to monitor, publish and resolve the faults in
the system. It also provides an interface to be used as a software emergency stop
for the robot. The multiplexer debug information is also displayed so the users can
improve the safety and security of the system by fixing the issues reported by the
multiplexers.
In total the ROSGuard system consists of over ten thousand lines of code. This
includes the built system and the example controllers. A report was generated with
the “sloccount” program and the largest component is the multiplexer consisting
nearly half of the codebase. The second largest and the most complex is the firewall,
which had multiple issues during the development, but were eventually fixed to
provide the needed functionality.
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4 ROSGuard messages
All communication between different ROSGuard components, client controllers and
the host components is done with ROS topics and their message descriptions are
presented in this chapter. It would be logical to use ROS services for the client
controllers to request access to the system, but the early testing with the firewall
proved the service connections to be unreliable. Using persistent service connections
this could be circumvented. The persistent service connections have problems
themselves [32] so all communications are done through topics. This also presented
the possibility to publish asynchronous messages to the controllers through the access
control channel.
All of the messages presented below belong to the rosguard_msgs package and they
include a ROS timestamp, which it is omitted in the detailed description. All message
types with control commands are enumerated for ease of use and the user does not
need to remember numerical codes.
4.1 Access request
The access_request message is used by the client controllers and task coordinators
to request control change to the specified resources. The allocator creates the topic
the messages are published into and it is shown in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: access_request.msg
time timestamp
uint8 command
INFO=0
RESERVE=1
FREE=2
OVERRIDE=99
string target
string source
The command is the type of the request to run on the system. It has enumerated
values of INFO, RESERVE, FREE and OVERRIDE. The default value is INFO
when a new message is generated. The command to release resource is FREE instead
of RELEASE as the control change on the multiplexers is done to “free” input. There
is also no possibility to mistype between release and reserve and as code would result
in errors when the enumeration is not found.
The target is the group name or the identifier, topic or actionserver, of the multiplexers
commanded through the allocator. The requesting controller needs to know the
hardware it wishes to access and relay it in the access request. Unknown targets are
rejected by the resource allocator.
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The final value is the source, which is the controllers own name or the name of the
controller the input is switched to on the multiplexer nodes. The source controller
must exist at least on one multiplexer or the resource allocator rejects the message.
4.2 Access response
The access_response message shown in table 4.2 is published by the allocator node
as a reply to the access_request message. Every client controller receive the messages
and need to filter the information directed at them. These include the responses to
the requests and notifications on overrides.
Table 4.2: access_response.msg
time timestamp
uint8 ans
SUCCESS=0
ERROR=1
RESERVED=2
OVERRIDE=99
string source
int8 info
EMPTY=0
SUCCESS_RESERVE=1
SUCCESS_FREE=2
NO_TARGET=3
NO_CONTROLLER=4
CONFLICT=5
TOO_MANY_REQUESTS=6
OVERRIDDEN=99
string info_text
The source of the request is included from the access_request for the queries and it
is also used to inform of the possible overrides on reserved resources. This matches
the controller name of the receiving controller.
The target carries the group or the identifier of the multiplexer node which has been
the object of the request. On overrides the target declares the resource which has
been overridden.
The answer to the request is enumeration of SUCCESS, ERROR or RESERVED
for the access control. OVERRIDE is used to tell any controller receiving it to treat
the message as a notice on revoked resources. Any response other than SUCCESS,
zero, on a request can be interpreted as a failure to the request.
The information fields clarify the received answer. The value can be EMPTY,
SUCCESS_RESERVE, SUCCESS_FREE, NO_TARGET, NO_CONTROLLER,
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CONFLICT, TOO_MANY_REQUETS or OVERRIDDEN. The OVERRIDDEN
is returned for override requests. The success messages are for the relevant request.
The EMPTY can only be returned on successful INFO requests. The CONFLICT
can be returned by INFO and FREE on unsuccessful operation and by RESERVE in
special cases when the multiplexer nodes behave erroneously. NO_TARGET and
NO_CONTROLLER are errors from the allocator, which cannot find the source or
target of the request. The TOO_MANY_REQUESTS is issued if the maximum of
two queued requests per controller are exceeded.
The info_text contains human readable result of the answer to ease debugging of
the system. The contained information is more detailed for failed group requests as
each conflicting multiplexer name is included in the message.
4.3 FW control
The firewall control message shown in table 4.3 should not be used manually and an
UI has been written to control the firewall. All the firewall nodes subscribe to the
firewall control topic.
Table 4.3: fw_control.msg
time timestamp
uint8 command
INFO=0
START=1
STOP=2
ADD=3
REMOVE=4
int8 mode
PROTECT=0
LOCK=1
string target
The command to the firewall may be INFO, START, STOP, ADD or REMOVE.
The INFO sends a request to the firewall nodes to report the current state on the
debug channel. START and STOP enable or disable the firewall operation. ADD
and REMOVE are used to load or delete topics on the firewall nodes.
The mode is used when adding topics to determine the operation on the requested
topic. The options are PROTECT and LOCK, which correspond to the firewall
operation modes. These are explained in the chapter 8 for the firewall.
The target is the fully resolved ROS topic to be added or removed on the firewall
nodes.
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4.4 FW debug
The firewall debug message in table 4.4 contain the status updates from the firewall
nodes or responses to the information request to a control message. Each firewall
node publishes these messages and the firewall controller subscribes on the debug
topic.
Table 4.4: fw_debg.msg
time timestamp
int8 status
STOPPED=0
RUNNING=1
ERROR=-1
string machine
string[] topics
The status of the firewall is either STOPPED or RUNNING and for error messages
the status is marked ERROR. The machine the message came from is included in
each message to identify the source of the message.
On normal operation the topics each firewall has are returned along the debug
messages, but on error messages the topics array is filled with human readable
information on the error.
4.5 MUX control
The multiplexer control message presented in table 4.5 is published by the allocator
node to the mux control topic and all multiplexers on the robot subscribe to it for
receiving commands.
Table 4.5: mux_control.msg
time timestamp
uint8 command
INFO=0
ACTIVATE=1
FREE=2
CREATE=3
DELETE=4
OVERRIDE=99
string source
string target
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The commands are INFO, ACTIVATE, FREE, CREATE, DELETE and OVERRIDE.
The info commands query the multiplexers if the source of the request is authorized
to execute changes for the control switch. ACTIVATE and FREE are used to reserve
and release the resource for the source of the request. OVERRIDE commands
command the multiplexer to the override mode, which is explained in the allocator
and multiplexer chapters. CREATE and DELETE were added for dynamic input
creation, but the current system does not support them.
The source is the controller name commanding the multiplexer and the target is
either a mux group name or the individual node identifier the command is to be
executed on.
4.6 MUX debug
The response to the multiplexer command is given on the debug channel with the
message shown in table 4.6, which the allocator subscribes in for the responses. The
debug message is also used to publish any events on the multiplexers and the user
interface for monitoring the system also subscribes to the topic.
Table 4.6: mux_debug.msg
time timestamp
string topicname
string[] groups
string input
string[] available_inputs
uint8 mode
NORMAL=0
SLOW=1
SLOW_STOP=2
FAST_STOP=3
int8 info
SUCCESS=0
FREE=1
MODE_CHANGE=3
CREATED=4
DELETED=5
RESERVED=6
CONFLICT=7
UNAUTHORIZED=8
LIMITER=9
INPUT_ON_INACTIVE=10
OVERRIDE=99
string target
string source
17
Each message includes the identifier of the multiplexer as a topic or actionserver
name and all the groups assigned on the multiplexer are also relayed on the message.
For status messages the current configured input controller is relayed back. Upon
unauthorized access to the multiplexer, the violating controller is returned on the
input field. The same is done for messages warning of active communications on an
inactive multiplexer input and of excessive velocities detected.
The current operation mode of the multiplexer, NORMAL, SLOW, SLOW_STOP
or FAST_STOP, is relayed along with the information on the cause of the message.
SUCCESS, FREE and OVERRIDE for successful control changes and RESERVED,
CONFLICT and UNAUTHORIZED for declined requests. The INPUT_ON_-
INACTIVE is used to inform of unintended input as explained before and LIMITER
is used to signify that the current input has exceeded velocity or acceleration limits
configured on the multiplexer. CREATED and DELETED are unused as the current
implementation does not support dynamically adding or removing input controllers.
4.7 MUX limit configure
As the design calles for the ability to safeguard the actuators from excessive velocities
and actuators, the feature needed to be configurable at runtime. Restarting the
system each time to test the limits of motion would lead to wasted time. The
multiplexer limits can be individually reconfigured on single control topic the mux
nodes communicate on by using the configuration message presented in table 4.7.
Table 4.7: mux_limit_configure.msg
time timestamp
string target
uint8 mask
N_LIN_A=0
N_LIN_V=1
N_ANG_A=2
N_ANG_V=3
TIMEOUT=4
S_VEL_RATIO=5
S_ACC_RATIO=6
float64 n_linear_acc
float64 n_linear_vel
float64 n_angular_acc
float64 n_angular_vel
float64 timeout
float64 s_vel_ratio
float64 s_acc_ratio
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Each message needs to define the target by using the identifier of the multiplexer
node. Mux groups cannot be used as identifiers. The component of the limit to
be modified is set by bytemasking an 8-bit value. Only the values masked will be
changed on the multiplexer. The mask values for normal linear and angular velocity
and acceleration are N_LIN_V, N_LIN_A, N_ANG_V and N_ANG_A. The
timeout value on can be changed with the TIMEOUT mask. The slow operation
mode is configured as modifier to the normal velocities with S_VEL_RATIO and
S_ACC_RATIO. The velocity ratio can be value of 0 to 1, but the acceleration
is locked between 0.3 and 1 as setting zero accelerations would lead to inability to
change the current velocities. A special mode was added by sending a message with
zero mask and zero timestamp. The queried multiplexer will reply with the current
values on the same topic.
4.8 Fault
The fault message is used to convey problems in the robot for the ROSGuard system.
A fault is defined as a hypothesized error or a failure on the robot or the environment
[33]. The multiplexers needed a message to change the operation modes based on
the events on the robot. There was no existing generic fault message the nodes could
use. The ROS diagnostics messages carried some information on the errors on the
robot, but it was unsuited for the ROSGuard system due to inflexibility. The fault
message was made to be used as a simplified failure notification for the system. The
categories presented here are the initial generalization for a service robot. The focus
on this thesis was not the detection and identification of failures and no completed
listing of faults were available. Instead surveys of faults were looked up and simplified
[13, 34, 35]. The resulting message is shown in table 4.8. More of the usage of the
faults is presented in the following chapters.
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Table 4.8: fault.msg
time timestamp
string source
string id
int16 type
DEBUG=0, ACCELERATION=1, ENVIRONMENT=2
CHASSIS=3, CONTROL=4, NAVIGATION=5
E_STOP=99, RESOLVED=-1
uint16 description
(acceleration) LOW_VIBRATION=1, HIGH_VIBRATION=2
THRESHOLD_EXCEEDED=3, ROBOT_TILTED=4
(environment) COLLISION=1, PINCH=2, HAZARDOUS_FOR_ROBOT=3
HAZARDOUS_FOR_HUMANS=4
(chassis) POWER_WARN=1, POWER_CRIT=2, STUCK=3
NO_CONTROL=4 OUT_OF_CONTROL=5
(control) CRASH=1, SENSOR_NULL=2
COMMUNICATION_ERROR=3
(navigation) NO_PATH=1, LOST=2, CONFINED=3
(e_stop) PRESSED=1, ACTIVE=2
uint8 severity
UNKNOWN=0
ENVIRONMENT_WARNING=1, ROBOT_WARNING=2
HUMAN_WARNING=3, ENVIRONMENT_HARM=4
ROBOT_HARM=5, HUMAN_HARM=6
int8 action
NORMAL=0, SLOW=1, SLOW_STOP=2, FAST_STOP=3
uint8[] data
string human_readable
The message includes the source of the fault. It is used to identify the component
publishing the fault as the system is built to support multiple monitoring components
to identify failures and hazards in the system and environment. Each fault is unique
and an identifier is attached to each message. New messages with same identifier are
ignored by the multiplexers unless the fault is resolved or the operation mode of the
robot is downgraded from the previous ones. The identifier is not allowed to be less
than three characters or the system will ignore the message.
The fault types are reduced to ACCELERATION, ENVIRONMENT, CHASSIS,
CONTROL, NAVIGATION, E_STOP and the default DEBUG. The type is also
used to signify if the fault has been handled and the fault can be removed by setting
it to RESOLVED. Further negative values are reserved to set the pending fault
timeout described in the next chapter. The fault types are further refined with
descriptions. The default zero is defined as UNKNOWN. The descriptions for
acceleration are LOW_VIBRATION, HIGH_VIBRATION, THRESHOLD_EX-
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CEEDED and ROBOT_TILTED. For environment they are COLLISION, PINCH,
HAZARDOUS_FOR_ROBOT and HAZARDOUS_FOR_HUMAN. Chassis de-
scriptions are POWER_WARN, POWER_CRIT, STUCK, NO_CONTROL and
OUT_OF_CONTROL. The software control is reduced to CRASH, SENSOR_-
NULL and COMMUNICATION_ERROR. Navigation has NO_PATH and E-stop
has PRESSED and ACTIVE.
Each fault also has a severity with values of ENVIRONMENT_WARNING, ROBOT_-
WARNING, HUMAN_WARNING and the same for HARM. The information in-
tended for the multiplexer nodes is set in the action, which may be the default
NORMAL, SLOW, SLOW_STOP or FAST_STOP. A free data field is provided
for applications which need to pass more data in the fault message. Finally a human
readable text is attached to the fault for easy inspection.
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5 Faults
The system was designed to have more features than the basic input switching in
the later stages of development by the request of the research group. One of these
features was the ability to manipulate the input depending on the state of the robot,
the requirements 5 and 6. A fault subsystem was also requested for the implemented
environment and these two features were combined into single fault message and
robot specific topic. Without the input manipulation the fault message would be
simple information from the nodes detecting and identifying the faults. By adding
the command for multiplexer states, the detecting nodes can determine if the failure
requires the robot to slow down or stop movement. The slowdown functionality is for
safety-related speed control and stop states are for category 2 stop as the system can
recover from them automatically. It is not a true emergency stop as the ROSGuard
system only impedes movement with software restrictions and the emergency stop is
prohibited from automatic resets [8]. The system can be interpreted as the protective
stop function required by ISO 10218-2:2011, which is for industrial robots but is still
a good guideline for any robotic applications. As the ROSGuard system is designed
to be a generic platform and only provides the framework, the end user needs to
ensure the robot platform meets the performance levels [36] defined for the operation.
For example the ISO 13482:2014 [8] for personal care robots.
The fault system can be bypassed by the end user if so desired. The users are not
obligated to use the faults if the different operation modes for multiplexers are not
needed and possibly some other system is used to monitor the robot. This increases
the flexibility of the system as better suited components may be used for coordination
on the events on the robot.
One of such systems is presented by Crestani et al. for mobile robots [37]. However
the paper does not provide a practical example, but as a whole the ROSGuard
system provides the needed components for the implementation for most of the
proposed functionality. Protective stop, dedicated fault detection and resolving
controller nodes, which can override the normal controllers to achieve the recovery,
are supported by ROSGuard components. The fault messages tie the system together
as it can be used to inform the different components, which can then form a decision
on the actions.
5.1 Architecture
Certain rules must be established as a single topic is used for all the communication
used by the fault system. The fault message carries information on faults and if
these faults have been resolved. A way for the components subscribing to the fault
message to differentiate between these two is the type of fault. The enumerations are
arranged so any positive value can be interpreted as a new fault, zero is for debug
and the negative values are for resolved faults or faults which are not yet active.
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Any component may subscribe or publish into the fault topic. Publishers need to
track the published messages and ensure they do not flood the topic with repeat
messages. One message per fault is allowed and it is tracked with the unique identifier.
The identifier has no restrictions other than it should be more than two characters
long. A reasonable identifier would be a short description of the fault, but any
random or hashed identifier is acceptable. To enforce the one message per fault rule,
the subscribers can keep track of the received faults and ignore further messages
with same identifiers. The multiplexer nodes keep track of the faults, but allow
replacement of the message in storage if the message degrades the operation mode
of the multiplexer. This is to ensure the faults slowing or stopping the robot get
through in cases where the fault publishers escalate the issue using the same fault
identifier.
The division of publisher and subscribers is left to the end user, but the intended
operation of the fault publishing and resolving of the faults requires two way com-
munication on the topic. The basic components are the fault detection nodes, the
fault processing nodes and combined controllers. Incorporating all fault detection
and identification features on single node or computer can prove problematic as the
processing power on mobile robot may be limited. Distributing them on multiple
nodes, computers on the robot or external should help the development and the
nodes can specialize in specific scenarios if needed.
5.1.1 Fault publishers
The nodes publishing the faults may be conducting fault detection and identification
in the traditional sense by analyzing the ongoing failures. But as the system can
slow the movements and even stop if necessary, the faults are also protecting the
robot, environment or interacting parties from future harm. The safety-related speed
control and protective stop features fall under these nodes. These may be for example
a slowdown of moving components if personnel are detected in the safeguarded
area of the robot and automatic stop if they are detected in the protected space
[8]. Stabilizing act may be for example if the robotic platform is unbalanced or on
uneven platform and the sensors detect the vibration or tilting of the body, the
detecting component can decide to command the multiplexers to slow down and
try keep the platform from losing balance. Another example where the robot may
need to be stopped is a typical collision where the extremities or the base of the
robot hit an unknown object and the maximum allowed acceleration thresholds are
exceeded. Even faults without effect on the multiplexer nodes are useful as ongoing
faults indicating problems in the actuators or critical power levels can be used to
modify the behaviour of the system.
Publishing a fault is done by creating the message, setting the current timestamp
and the name of node publishing the fault. Next the fault type, description, severity
and action are set depending on the fault. The controller may append extra data on
the fault message if it is needed for the nodes receiving the message. A clear human
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readable description of the fault needs to be added for the users to have an easy
understandable fault description. The identifier of the fault needs to be over two
characters long and preferably unique.
5.1.2 Fault resolvers
The fault resolvers are components dedicated for reacting to the events in the system.
They are responsible for clearing the ongoing faults in the system. Usage is freeform
as the system only provides the messages. For example in cases where a low power
warning has been published, a resolver may wait and try reserving the resources to
lead the robot to a charging station. If there is no central coordinator, this may
fail and the controller does not activate. Once the power levels reach critical stage
the controller may start forcing the access so the robot does not suffer from power
failure. Of course forcing the access may not be safe depending on the ongoing task
so either the user needs to decide if this is allowed or the fault resolver may have
knowledge of the executing task and decide it automatically. The ROSGuard access
reservation component can provide the name of the controllers currently accessing
the needed resources and this information is returned on failed access reservations.
Resolving a fault can be accomplished by taking the identifier of the resolved fault and
setting it as the identifier of the new message. The name of the node should be added
as source of the message as it is responsible of resolving the fault. The type needs
to be set as RESOLVED and the timestamp to the current time before publishing
the fault. This same can be done by taking the old fault message and modifying the
type, timestamp and source if the resolver node saves the fault messages. The other
values in the RESOLVED messages do not affect the system.
5.1.3 Combined controllers
A combined controller is as the name implies a combined fault detector and resolver
in the same package. In its simplest form it may be the safety-related speed controller,
commanding the platform to slow down or stop in the presence of human and then
clearing the fault once the safe distances are re-established. The presented example
controller does not command any movements.
More complex and specialized controllers may be developed for the situations needed.
An edge case, which can be handled by a dedicated controller tailored for the task.
The example provided in the resource allocation chapter 7.2.3 on overriding resources
could be a combined controller as it is used to recover from unexpected collisions
during navigation.
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5.2 Pending faults
The system also provides a way to publish delayed faults. These are intended to be
used when the task being executed is known to cause issues if it not completed in
the predefined timeframe. The controller executing the task publishes the fault as it
executes the relevant event leading to the possible hazard. Once the hazard has been
passed the pending fault can cleared like normal ones by sending the RESOLVED
type with the appropriate identification.
If the pending fault has not been resolved before the set time, it is published as a
normal fault. This is done by the ROSGuard HTTP user interface monitor and it is
needed for the pending faults to work. As the delayed faults are communicated on
the same topic and message as normal faults, the type of the fault is set to negative
value. This ensures that other controllers ignore the messages as real faults can only
have positive values.
The pending faults can only use the first 99 descriptions of faults and the type is
allowed for positive values within reason as the messages are transported as 16-bit
unsigned integer. The amount of time the faults are pending is encoded in the type
of the fault as negative value. It is calculated as by taking the negative value of the
minutes the fault times out to be published and subtracting one from it.
The minimum delay is two minutes as the value of -1 is reserved for the RESOLVED
enumeration. The accuracy the messages are published on timeout is ± 15 seconds
at the default HTTP monitor update rate. The time is transported as 16-bit integer
so the maximum delay is almost 23 days. The real type of the fault is encoded to the
description by multiplying it with 100 and adding it to the description, the monitoring
node decodes these back into normal faults and stores them for publishing.
An example of a pending fault could be a request for the robot assistant to issue a
warning if the owner has not taken medication within thirty minutes from a specified
location. In this case the system is used for crude timing tasks, but publishing a
fault at the time of request keeps track if the medication has not been served. If the
fault has been published it can alter the behaviour of the robot and a monitoring
node may forward the specific fault to a supervising party. The example can be
further developed by the supervising party overtaking the robot into teleoperation for
observing and helping the owner, possibly avoiding the need to travel to the owners
residence.
5.3 ROS Diagnostics to fault
The ROS diagnostics layer was rejected as the activation method because the multi-
plexer operation modes would have conflicted with the existing diagnostics messages.
The diagnostics messages provide information on the state of the robot and these
may be wished to be imported into the fault messages so controllers may use the
state to determine their actions.
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The diagnostics to fault package provides a node, which can translate the diagnostics
messages to the rosguard_msgs/fault message. As the diagnostic is mainly infor-
mation on the robot state, the fault type is defined as CHASSIS for all messages
published by the node. The diagnostics message is usually not enough to determine
the detailed description on the fault message and it is defined as UNKNOWN. The
same value is defined for the severity of the fault.
The node translates all diagnostics messages with elevated diagnostics status, ERROR
or WARN, into faults. By default they do not affect the multiplexer operation, but
a simple name matching has been provided to filter the messages. Three different
filters provide varying responses to the diagnostics messages. The filters accept
an array of strings as parameters and they are matched against the name of the
diagnostics message. If a diagnostics name contains the defined string, the filter
is activated. The action_normal translates messages with diagnostics status of
WARN into SLOW state for the multiplexers and ERROR into SLOW_STOP. The
actionfilter_error_stop does not modify WARN diagnostics and only translates
ERROR into SLOW_STOP. The final actionfilter_error_slow behaves similarly,
but instead converts the ERROR to SLOW, not stopping the robot.
5.3.1 Care-O-bot 4 power state monitor
Although the provided environment for COB supplies ROS diagnostics on information
for the actuators and sensors, it does not include the power and battery status. The
robot is publishing PowerState message from the cob_messages package informing
the voltage, current, remaining runtime and other statistics. The robot also has node
which can be configured to actuate light or activate speech synthesis to inform the
user if the battery levels are low.
As the information is not in the diagnostics, a package was created to include Care-
O-bot chassis specific fault monitors. The rosguard_cob4_chassis_fault_monitors
currently includes a power_state_monitor node, which can be configured to publish
the ROSGuard fault messages. The low and critical battery levels are configured
as percentages. The node will publish CHASSIS fault with POWER_WARN and
POWER_CRIT if the battery levels drop below the configured values and the robot
is not charging. The node keeps track of the published faults and it can be configured
to automatically clear the faults when the robot is connected to the charger.
5.4 Future improvements
The fault message presented here is a working placeholder, which is to be expanded
as the need arises. The target was to deliver an easy to understand and configure
fault information for the applications and end users. Using this information may
be difficult as the receiving end needs to manually filter the desired information by
subscribing to the topic and filtering the unwanted messages. In future this can be
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improved by providing a library keeping track of the faults and filtering only the
desired faults for inspection by the client component.
The usage of the fault system is not mandatory for the controllers. The usage is
flexible and may even be completely ignored if the multiplexer nodes do not need
to be commanded. Once different approaches on the functionality are made, they
should be documented for reference on how the system can be utilized.
The usage of different controllers for resolving the faults needs work as there may
be multiple possible ways to resolve an issue. The coordination is undefined and
overlapping components may try resolving the issue simultaneously and the controller
may resolve the issue by trying to force access for themselves, resulting in endless
loop of access reservations. Ideally this should not happen as each fault would have
its own response on the system or the system has dedicated analyzer deciding the
course of action on faults.
The pending faults have poor resolution and excessive maximum delay for normal
operation. It is not intended for precise operation as it is a fallback for tasks failing.
If more resolution and accuracy is needed the calculations and update rate in the
monitoring node publishing the faults can be modified.
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6 Input multiplexer
As the initial testing proved the use of single topic for multiple controllable inputs
to be unacceptable with the firewall due to long control switch times, the inputs
from each controller were separated from the hardware target. By designating an
input interface for each defined controller, separate from the hardware, some degree
of isolation is already achieved. Also additional features were be added to the
system as the messages needed to be relayed to the hardware. The need to relay
the commands from the selected controller to hardware interface is the main feature
of the multiplexer, or mux for short. The use of firewall for input multiplexing
would have given the option to use it on any topic, but the requirement of creating
a subscriber for each controller input leads to a need to specialize each input to
match the output to the hardware interface. Fortunately the approach for robot
hardware control interfaces is widely standardized on ROS to handful of message
types. The use of these messages and action types allows for additional features
including velocity and acceleration limits along the possibility of stopping or slowing
down the output to the target interface for the system requirements 4 through 6.
These limits are configured in the robot specific launch files, but an interface for
reconfiguring these at runtime has been provided incase an experiment needs to
be performed at varying limits. Reconfiguring is done at a single topic, which can
also be used to query the current limits. The set limits are used for the normal
operation mode. Slower operation mode is achieved by scaling these parameters.
Other mux specific topics include the mux debug and the control switch interface.
Each mux node receives the control change command from the robot specific allocator
as detailed in section 3.2. The slowdown and stop feature activation were integrated
into the ROSGuard fault messages and each mux node keeps track of the ongoing
faults affecting the multiplexer operational states.
Each of the mux nodes are individually identified by the output topic or action
name. The mux nodes can be individually addressed by these in the access control
requests. For better control over the hardware each node can be assigned multiple
names, designated as groups, that can be called over the access reservation. A
hardware resource can have multiple driving interfaces with different control methods.
Grouping these into under single name can improve immunity against accidental
motion. When using the group name to reserve the resource, all the interfaces
associated with the single hardware resource are diverted to the controller with access
reservation. Using these groups even multiple hardware interfaces can be packed
together as an unit. For example the arm actuators and attached grippers can be
organized as a whole arm or tree structures can be build to ensure the whole chain
from robot base to the designated actuator is under single controller. A special group
called “robot” is embedded into each mux node to be used as a global group, which
can be used to reserve the whole robot.
When using tree structures or the global group, the reserving controller does not need
to actuate all the resources. The mux nodes do not check if the reserved controller
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has an input configured. In these cases the input switch is done and the output is
locked to null output. This is one of the reasons the OVERRIDE in the ROSGuard
allocator can take over overlapping groups without issues.
6.1 Faults in multiplexer
The simplified fault system was integrated into the multiplexer nodes for the function
of software emergency stop and speed control. Separated from the hardware emergency
stop, the soft E-stop can be used for automated stopping and slowing down of the
robot platform with possibility to lift the soft E-stop within software for the platform
to operate normally without constant user intervention.
The mux nodes implement the stopping and slowing down functions of by modifying
the received messages from the controllers before passing them to the hardware
interface. The four operations modes match the action presented in the ROSGuard
fault message: NORMAL, SLOW, SLOW_STOP and FAST_STOP. In normal mode
the outputs are passed through to the hardware unless any of the configured velocity
or acceleration limits are exceeded. If the limits are exceeded, the multiplexers clamps
the outputs to the maximum allowed values and publishes a debug message informing
about the exceeded velocities. The slow mode reduces the limits to the configured
ratios, slowing down the incoming and ongoing movements, to the maximum allowed
levels if the interface supports it. The slow stop is first of the modes stopping all
movement. It allows the movement to decelerate to zero if the interface supports it.
In the fast stop mode the outputs are forced to zero instantly.
For these modes to operate they have a priority based on the faults received. The fast
stop has the highest priority followed by slow stop and slow. The normal operating
mode has lowest priority. This is done by tracking the incoming faults and their
identifiers. Each fault affecting the state of the mux is saved into memory. The faults
can be removed from the mux node by resolving the fault. All the faults leading to
the operation modes need to be resolved before the operation mode is elevated. Both
of the stopping faults need to be resolved before the mux allows movement and all
the slowing faults must be resolved before the normal operation mode is applied.
The exception to this rule is the OVERRIDE coming from the allocator. The override
is meant to give access to a controller for it to recover from a fault. To achieve
this the robot needs to move. Therefore the OVERRIDE can lift the multiplexers
from stopped state into slow state even with active faults, partially fulfilling the
requirement 8. A new stopping fault received by the mux node will bring the
movement to halt, so the override mode is not a complete control over the robot
movement. The override needs to be activated again for the robot to move in these
conditions. Freeing the resource cancels the override operation and the priority of
operation modes is again enforced. If override is issued on a moving actuator, the
multiplexer will force the current actions to be halted and the overriding controller
will not receive a resource with prior commands.
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6.2 Configuration
All of the multiplexer nodes share the same configuration parameter names in different
interface types. The ROSGuard namespace is passed with the robot parameter as
with all other components.
The output to the hardware interface is configured with the output_topic parameter.
For single topic interfaces this is the topic and for action interfaces the parent name
before the goal of the action is used. The inputs for the controllers are formed
after the configured output with the naming scheme of “$output_topic”/mux_-
input/”$controller_name”. In the case of single topic interface, such as geometry_-
msgs/Twist, the controller name is the input and for action interface the action
server can be pointed to this as the action control topics are generated after the
name. The input controllers are defined in the input_controllers parameter and it is
a space separated list of the controller names. Note that these names are passed to
the allocator node for checking the incoming requests so they need to match on the
client controllers and ROS naming standards [27].
The group names are configured on the groups parameter which is space separated
and like the controller names. These are passed to the allocator for input verification.
The global group “robot” does not need to be configured manually. The two timing
parameters, updaterate and timeout, are interface specific and the defaults are 10Hz
for the updaterate and 3 seconds for the timeout.
The input limits are defined for linear and angular parameters. The linear velocity
limit is defined with lin_vel_limit and acceleration with lin_acc_limit. For angular
motion these are ang_vel_limit and ang_acc_limit. These limits cannot be negative
and absolute value of the parameter is used incase a negative value is defined. Slowing
down the movement in slow mode is achieved by scaling the acceleration and velocity
limits with the slowdown_a_ratio and slowdown_v_ratio. These parameters are
checked for sane limits. The velocity ratio is to be between 1 and 0 so the system
cannot be sped up in the slow mode. The acceleration limits are to be between
0.3 and 1. The minimum needs to be set as with acceleration scaled to zero, the
system cannot change any velocities including the ongoing motions. Default ratio
for the velocities is 0.3 and 0.9 for accelerations. For some interfaces the parameter
jointStateFeedback needs to be configured to point to the jointState message of
the actuator in question. Without this the limit calculations do not work and the
messages are passed through without checking the limits.
6.3 Reconfiguring input limits
The possible need for reconfiguring specified mux nodes during experiments was
presented before. This functionality is accessible through the mux_control/mux_-
limits topic under the ROSGuard namespace. Each mux node can be reconfigured
by sending rosguad_msgs/mux_limit_configure message to the topic. The target
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is specified by the unique name of the mux node, the output topic name. Group
names are not allowed as a target. Each of the configuration parameters presented
before for the input limits and slowdown functionality can be modified. To configure
a parameter, the values need to be sent along with a command to load the defined
values. This command is a simple bytemask for each parameter, 1 for loading the
value and 0 for ignoring the received value and using the old one. The bytemasks are
enumerated. For example in C to enable the sent linear velocity limit the bytemask
is set by bitshifting the enumeration.
mask = (1<<(rosguard_msgs : : mux_limit_configure : :N_LIN_V) ) ;
The current configuration can be queried from the same topic by sending a message
with zero timestamp and zero mask to the target. This can be used to read the
current values and increment some value before sending it back. This may be used
for example in cases where the current limits are restricting an experiment and they
needs to be increased. Caution should be used when increasing the limits to ensure
safety for the robot, user and environment.
6.4 Error and debug reporting
The limits specified previously are enforced by the multiplexer nodes. Exceeding these
limits leads to error reporting on the mux_control/debug topic under the ROSGuard
namespace. The offending controller name, mux identifier and operation mode are
supplied in the debug message. This message is common when the movements are
slowed down in the slow mode and the mux nodes need to limit the output. Under
normal operation this tells that the current controller is commanding the robot with
excessive motions and should be reconfigured to stay within the safe limits.
Other areas the debug information is sent include the checks on number of publishers
on the output topic. If there are multiple publishers on the target interface the
purpose of the multiplexer could have been bypassed as a node is directly publishing
into the hardware. The same checks are performed on the input controllers as they
are designed to only have single publisher per input, but this information is only
printed as an error to the console as accidentally having two controllers on input
topic is more unlikely to happen than controllers on the original control topic.
The subscriber per input was designed for separation so only one can access the
hardware interface at a time. The inputs are monitored for activity and if any is
detected while an input is not the one currently active, it is reported on the debug
message as input on inactive error. This is to help debugging the system as the
controllers are not supposed to output any commands while they do not have the
resource. This can indicate of a misconfigured or a faulty controller. Operation mode
changes due to faults are also reported in the debug messages along the activation of
override modes.
The mux debug is also the communication back to the allocator so it can monitor
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the success of reservations and query the status of the mux nodes. Through this
channel the input controller names and groups are passed to the allocator during the
autodiscovery of multiplexer nodes.
6.5 Interfaces
As the robot movement is usually executed by moving joints or wheels, the number
of interfaces used to command these are limited. The movement of the robot on
non-walking types is commonly not a low level motor driver, but a system where the
robot base can be commanded to move and rotate in different directions depending
on the drive system. The ROS message geometry_msgs/Twist is the input for these
and the navigation stacks included in ROS output this message type.
For joint articulated actuators there are multiple messages and actions. A common ac-
tion is the control_msgs/FollowJointTrajectoryAction, which can be used for example
with MoveIt! Movement Planning Framework. Additionally all the interfaces used by
Care-O-bot 4 are implemented. These include the trajectory_msgs/JointTrajectory,
Twist and std_msgs/Float64MultiArray for joint positions and velocities.
The interfaces can be divided into two categories based on the operation principle.
Continuous output and event based. The event based interfaces have a single message
containing multiple movements with defined timeframes. The FollowJointTrajectory-
Action and JointTrajectory belong into this category as they send trajectory points
with goaltimes to the actuators. In the continuous output interfaces the messages
are passed periodically for the actuators to move. These include the Twist and
Float64MultiArray interfaces. The continuous type are required to stop outputting
after publishing zero movement messages for two times the timeout if there are
no input messages. This is to ensure that the hardware resources do not receive
conflicting commands on the different interfaces.
6.5.1 Twist
The Twist message in the geometry_msgs package is a six axis linear and angular
message. The multiplexer treats this as a continuous velocity message type as it
used for example to move and rotate a robot base and end actuators as long as the
messages keep flowing.
The continuous operation means that the mux will publish to the output at the
update rate regardless of the input frequency. The timeout is used to zero and
shutdown the output when the input messages stop. For example if the input is
commanded to 1 unit on linear X and the output has reached the desired value and
the input messages stop streaming, the output is held for the timeout and after this
the desired output is set to zero. The output is decelerated within the limits. The
output is switched off after output messages with zero values have been published
for twice the timeout as defined earlier.
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The twist messages work around zero output so they do not have any feedback from
the actuators. Zero as output is considered a stopped motion so the fast stop mode
publishes zeroes when activated. Acceleration control works in the twist interface so
slow stop uses normal acceleration limits to bring movement to halt. The slow mode
uses the defined acceleration ratio to bring the velocities to the new levels.
The twist interface publishes a zero output command as a last message on shutdown
to ensure the actuator stops movement even if the node is shutdown while outputting
data.
6.5.2 Float64MultiArray joint velocities
The Float64MultiArray works in similar way to the twist node that it is outputting
continuous stream of data containing angular velocity information. It does not require
feedback from the actuators, but to work it needs to know the number of joints it is
operating on. This information is extracted from the input messages and saved. As
the number of joints is a variable, the node does not publish a zero output message
upon shutdown. This should not prove a problem as in Care-O-bot 4 simulation
the testing showed the default timeout on the hardware interface to be under half a
second and the zero on shutdown is a corner case.
6.5.3 Float64MultiArray joint positions
The joint position version of the Float64MultiArray requires a feedback from the
actuator jointState in order for the node to know the current position of the joints.
Angular position information is received from the input and it is bound to the velocity
limits approximately regarding the update rate, start and end positions.
In simulation using the joint position interface resulted in the actuators using full
acceleration in the movements. As only the position information is passed, the
acceleration limits cannot be set. Using higher update rate the movements can
be divided into smaller steps, but even at 50Hz the movement was observed to be
jerky in simulation. Still even with the default 10Hz rate the actuator in simulation
moved at much slower pace than directly relaying the end position to the hardware
interface. This interface does not command the current position back to the actuator
at shutdown as it could prove hazardous if the jointState is delayed, corrupted or
misconfigured. For the same reason it does not send the current position to the
actuator at control changes to stop the movement.
6.5.4 FollowJointTrajectoryAction
The first event based message the multiplexer was developed on was the one used by
the cob_dashboard for commanding the simple demonstration movements on the
Care-O-bot 4. The simulation environment was heavily used to test and debug the
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The problem was fixed by generating an intermediate point in front of the current
joint angles with the new velocity limit as the velocity goal in the message, if current
velocity exceeded the new slower limit. The point can be calculated from the given
angular acceleration limits and the velocity difference. The trajectory controller will
meet this intermediate point and then proceed to the endpoint with the extended
goaltime, slowing down the actuator.
This solution worked only for the single endpoint trajectory where normally trajec-
tories include multiple points to constrain the movement to a planned path. For
the slowdown function to work, these points would need to be tracked and the
actionserver only reports completion on the whole trajectory. The second problem is
the actionserver only accepting unique trajectory names as goal identifiers. This was
fixed by generating a new identifier for the replacement trajectories, but mapping
them to the original identifiers for the actionclient on the input controller. In the
end the slowing down functionality was not reliable and the trajectory replacement
and goal identification remapping were removed.
The mux node does not slow down the ongoing motions. New trajectories after the
slow mode has been entered will receive the new limits. The mux does not support
slow stop and all motion is stopped as in the fast stop. All goals are cancelled which
leads to the hardware interface to stop motion. Later in testing this was found out
to cause hardware faults when the arm actuators were stopped from motion. The
mux also stops all motions between control changes and during the shutdown.
6.5.5 JointTrajectory
The JointTrajectory works almost identically with the FollowJointTajectoryAction
as the message is the same as inside the action goal. The output_topic is defined as
the command interface, but the JointTrajectory also includes a state topic, which is
automatically included for the client controllers. The command input and state can
be found under mux_input/controller_name/command and state.
The JointTrajectory interface does not include any provisions for slowing down
ongoing movement or slow stop. Only the cancellation of movement is supported
and it is done on control change and on shutdown.
6.6 Care-O-bot 4-8 usage
The robot has distinctive groups based on the hardware. The Schunk arms and the
head joint use all of the interfaces presented above, the FollowJointTrajectoryAction,
JointTrajectory, Twist and Float64MultiArray for joint position and velocity control.
The arms are configured to groups arm_left and arm_right and the head joint is
in the head group. The arms have configured limit of 1 rad/s with acceleration of
2 rad/s2 on the individual joints and 0.1 m/s and 0.1 rad/s for the Twist interface
affecting the endjoint. The head has the same limits excluding the Twist as it is
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working on single joint instead of multiple. The Twist limits are the same 1 rad/s
velocity with acceleration of 2 rad/s2 for all interfaces.
The sensorring uses the same interfaces as above excluding the Twist and is in the
sensorring group. The grippers have interfaces for the FollowJointTrajectoryAction,
JointTrajectory and Float64MultiArray joint position and they are in the gripper_-
left and gripper_right groups. The grippers are also added to the arm_left and
arm_right groups because they work as extensions for the arms and are likely to be
used together. The limits for the sensorring and the grippers are the same 1 rad/s
and 2 rad/s2 as for other angular movements.
The base has only Twist interface and the limits are configured to match the existing
velocity limits. The linear limit is 0.31 m/s where the original is 0.3 m/s. Acceleration
is set to 0.4 m/s2 to get around a second for acceleration to full speed. The rotation
of the base is set to the 0.5 rad/s with acceleration of 0.5 rad/s2.
6.7 Future improvements
The FollowJointTrajectoryAction and TrajectoryAction on the arm interfaces on the
Care-O-bot 4 can trigger hardware faults when the movement is stopped even at
slower velocities when using the SLOW_STOP operation mode commanded by the
fault topic. As mentioned before, the slowdown functions are not operational on
these interface types. The arms need to be recovered from the fault state for them to
function again. This could be avoided by not cancelling the current motion, which
causes the sudden stop of actuators. Instead a new position ahead of the current
movement could be calculated and set as a new goal with zero target velocities. This
could lead to the joints decelerating during the SLOW_STOP and not trigger a
hardware fault on the arm actuators.
Second improvement also involves these two interfaces, the slowdown feature described
before is not working as keeping track of the passed point was not implemented, but
the slowdown feature was implemented and tested on with only the joint end position
defined on the action interface. The trajectory replacement can be executed using
the existing functions checking the limits. Only the tracking of points, removing
the passed points and possibly generating an intermediate slowdown point as done
in the testing would need to be implemented. The action goal renaming and name
mapping needed for the client controllers actionserver is done, but commented out in
the codebase as the slowdown functionality was disabled after testing.
The system does not provide any functionality for directly limiting forces produced
by the actuators. The parameters are not defined and the limit reconfiguration does
not include enumerations for forces. This was not implemented as the Care-O-bot 4
the system is being developed for does not support the ROS effort interfaces. The
jointTrajectory messages include an effort component, but the current implementation
does not support it. The ability to limit the commanded forces could be added later,
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but as a workaround a fault monitor can be used to stop the robot if excessive forces,
not the commanded ones, are detected.
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7 Resource Allocator
A component for coordinating the resources for the controllers was needed to fulfill
the system requirement 2. A central controller, the allocator node, was developed.
Using the hardware endpoints, the multiplexer nodes, for the resource allocation
was deemed unsafe and difficult to implement due to the communication needed for
appropriate operation, as each multiplexer can be in different state and belong into
different overlapping groups. Directly requesting the control access from them could
lead to issues if communication between nodes is not perfect.
The client-service model for the access request would also need a dedicated node
for serving the response to the requesting controller. A truly distributed system
could be developed using the multiplexer nodes dynamically assigning one for each
request, but this was deemed overly complex. A separate node for receiving and
processing the access requests, which would also command and receive data from the
multiplexer nodes, was considered a more viable option.
The ROSGuard system is designed for use with multiple commanding controllers
executing diverse tasks and the allocator node is the primary interface for accessing the
resources on the robot as directly commanding the multiplexers is not recommended.
The client controllers or a separate coordinator, such as SMACH [28] overseeing and
regulating the executing controllers, use the services provided by the allocator to
query the state of the multiplexer nodes and command the requested controller to
be connected into the hardware resources.
As with the other components, all the configuration parameters and control interfaces
are in the robot namespace, which is passed to the node at launch. Additional
parameters are the input controllers and groups the allocator recognizes as valid
input for the requests. The updaterate determines the periodic intervals the queued
requests are processed. However the input controllers and the grouping are already
defined in the multiplexer nodes. Leaving these parameters undefined can be done
on the allocator. If either the input controllers or the groups are not defined, the
allocator does an autodiscovery on the multiplexer nodes and gathers the controller
names, groups and the control topic names from the multiplexer nodes at system
launch. The controller names, mux topics and their groups are the only information
stored on the allocator node. The state of multiplexer nodes is not tracked and is
queried each time the allocator requires information from the nodes. This simplifies
the operation as the allocator does not need to keep track of the grouping relations
and their overlap on each multiplexer node. As the multiplexer does not store the
information, it can be shut down and restarted without affecting the state of the
robot. Only requests published during the inactive period are lost.
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7.1 Interface
The client sending a request to the allocator uses the access_request.msg from the
rosguard_msgs package. These are replied with the access_response.msg after the
allocator has processed the request. These messages are passed in the respective
topics under the robot namespace at access/request and access/response.
In the request are included the necessary command, INFO, RESERVE, FREE or
OVERRIDE, which is passed to the allocator along with the target of the request and
the source controller name. The request also needs to be timestamped as requests
which have 60 seconds or more offset to the current ROS time are ignored. This was
done to protect the access control to only accept request generated right at the time
of request. During testing it was found out to cause problems as request accidentally
played back with rosbag would go through even if the timestamps were hours into
future on simulation time. These messages are not responded and the clients need to
implement a 60 second timeout for the access requests.
The response to these requests depends on the type of request and the state of
the multiplexer nodes. Possible answers are SUCCESS, ERROR, RESERVED and
OVERRIDE. Other data include the source of the original request and the target.
Additional information is provided in an information field and a human readable
info_text field. The response topic is shared between all the clients so the clients
need to filter their own messages. Therefore the source controller name received
on the corresponding request is passed back so the related client can identify the
responses. Each controller is allowed to have two pending requests queued. Otherwise
the allocator will answer with ERROR and TOO_MANY_REQUESTS on the info
field. This was done to reduce possible control flood as a misconfigured controller
could queue multitude of requests and delay legitimate request beyond the 60 second
timeout.
Client controllers must send requests with the predefined, either by autodiscovery
from the multiplexer nodes or from the ones defined for the allocator, controller
names and targets or the requests are answered with ERROR and either NO_-
CONTROLLER or NO_TARGET in the detailed information. No queries to the
multiplexer nodes are made in these cases.
In cases of successful INFO requests, meaning that the queried resource is free for
the source controller to modify, the answer is SUCCESS with EMPTY information
field. For RESERVE and FREE the information fields are SUCCESS_RESERVE
and SUCCESS_FREE.
For failed commands the INFO and RESERVE will be responded with RESERVED
and CONFILCT in the information field, the offending controllers and their reserved
targets are listed in the info_text field of the message. If a reservation fails, no
resources are allocated to the source of the request fulfilling the requirement 7.
A failed FREE will respond with ERROR and CONFLICT, meaning that at least one
of the target multiplexers has been reserved by another controller and the requesting
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controller was not allowed to release it. These nodes are listed in the info_text field
of the response. Note that the FREE command does relinquish all the resources it is
able to and cancels all ongoing or future movements. This is fundamental in cases
where the OVERRIDE command has been used as resources need to released by
sending a FREE command to the global group ‘robot’ to free all the resources the
controller has. The override functionality on the multiplexers is explained earlier as
it is a special operation used to recover the ROSGuard system from fault states.
The OVERRIDE command can only fail if the controller or target do not exist and
it is always responded with SUCCESS and OVERRIDDEN in the information field.
Even resources reserved by other controllers will be handed over to the overriding
controller with their actions cancelled, fulfilling the requirement 8. The controllers
which have been overridden will receive a message on the access response topic with
OVERRIDE in the answer field, OVERRIDDEN in the information field and the
resource the controller has been relieved of in the target field. Using this information
the controllers can determine if and what resources have been overridden and then
adjust their operation accordingly.
7.2 Operation examples
The following cases demonstrate the usage and operation of the allocator in normal
usage.
7.2.1 Reserving a group
A client controller needs access to the hardware to execute movement on the robot
chassis. The robot chassis is in the ‘base’ group on the ROSGuard system and it
includes all moving hardware interfaces on the robot base. The controller has input
named ‘move_test’ on the chassis geometry_msgs/Twist multiplexer. The robot is
named ‘test_robot’ and it is used as the ROSGuard namespace for the robot.
New rosguard_msgs/access_request message is generated and timestamped with
ros::Time::now(). The command is set to rosguard_msgs::access_request::RESERVE,
target is set to ‘base’ and source to ‘move_test’ before publishing the message to the
target topic on /test_robot/access/request. Figure 7.1 shows the communication
generated on the system by the request.
The allocator receives the request and queues it for the next processing cycle. The
message is accepted as the timestamp is correct and the source controller and
target exist. As the processing starts, the allocator queries the target group for
the source controller on the multiplexer nodes and the nodes recognizing the group
name reply back to the allocator with their current state. If all the responses
received after one second are positive for the control change, a new query is made
to the multiplexer nodes with the control change command. Again all the relevant
nodes respond back and if there are no errors the control change is accepted and
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the client controller ‘move_test’ is responded by sending a rosguard_msgs/access_-
response message to topic /test_robot/access/response with rosguard_msgs::access_-
response::SUCCESS as answer and rosguard_msgs::access_response::SUCCESS_-
RESERVE in the information field. The ‘move_test’ is written into the source field
and the target is set to ‘base’. Using these the client can filter the response from
the allocator. The control access request reserving the ‘base’ takes minimum of 1.5
seconds due to the communication. This is an acceptable figure as the elapsed time
is low enough that the user may not notice it unless closely observing. The resource
needs to be stopped when the control is handed over and the 1.5 seconds is likely to
be mixed with the perceived operation of the robot. As explained earlier, the upper
bound may be 60 seconds if there is control flood the allocator is processing. After
the 60 seconds the requests are ignored. The controller needs to abort the operation
if it has not received a response within the one minute timeframe and try again.
If the first query to the multiplexer nodes fails due to some other controlling having
reserved resources of the ‘base’ group, the second query is not made and the response
message is answered with rosguard_msgs::access_response::RESERVED and ros-
guard_msgs::access_response::CONFLICT in the information field. The conflicting
nodes are in the info_text field. The same response is made if the second query
changing the input fails on any node and the multiplexer nodes already reserved by
the command are reverted back into unreserved state.
Figure 7.1: Successful control request.
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7.2.2 Freeing resources
Now the previously reserved resource is released as the controller ‘move_test’ has
finished executing the task and needs to allow access for other controllers. The request
message is done as previously, but the command is set to rosguard_msgs::access_-
request::FREE. In figure 7.2 the interactions are shown.
After the allocator has queued the request, it starts to process it on the next cycle.
An information query is sent to the multiplexer nodes and the nodes recognizing
the group respond to the query. The info requests received by the multiplexer
nodes are reserved to the ‘move_test’ controller and return without error as the
requesting controller has permission to execute changes on the nodes. Next the
allocator sends the free requests to the multiplexer nodes and the control change
is executed and all movement is stopped, freeing the multiplexer to accept com-
mands from any controller. The allocator then sends message to the response topic
with rosguard_msgs::access_response::SUCCESS as the answer and rosguard_-
msgs::access_response::SUCCESS_FREE in the information field. The response
times for freeing the resources is the same 1.5 seconds as for reserving the resources
as the behaviour is mostly identical.
The FREE command may fail, but unlike in the RESERVE, the changes are
not reverted. All the commanded targets are released if the commanding con-
troller has authorization to do so. Only the controllers that have reserved the
Figure 7.2: Freeing resources without errors.
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multiplexer node may relieve them. On failure the answer is set to rosguard_-
msgs::access_response::ERROR, the information is set to rosguard_msgs::access_-
response::CONFLICT and the failed targets are in the info_text field for inspection.
Failure on the FREE command is not critical and is expected in the next example.
7.2.3 Overriding resources
In this example the robot has been executing a navigation task, but has collided
with a table as the table edge is protruded and does not show up on the floor level
laser scanners. The collision has exceeded the limits in vibration and acceleration
sensors and an collision fault has been published on the ROSGuard system as a
reaction. This has resulted in a stopped state. The multiplexer nodes and the robot
do not move as it is not in normal operation mode. This is intended as the navigation
system does not see the table and may collide again with it. In this example the
navigation system has reserved a group called ‘body’ which includes the actuators
on the robot base and the torso, which has a single rotating joint tilting the robot.
This was done to prevent the torso movement during navigation as it could affect
the balance of the robot.
A controller named ‘collision_recovery_test’ is trying to recover from this fault
by navigating backwards, at an angle determined by the closest point on the laser
scanners, half a meter and then moving two meters in the direction set by the
navigation target, avoiding the previously taken path, before relieving command and
clearing the fault. The override mode only allows slow movement as the robot was
in stopped state. This is fine for the recovery test as it uses low velocity and the
vibration sensors to detect the obstacle it has collided with before. Low velocity
collision do not exceed the limits set in vibration and acceleration sensors. This is
important as even in the override mode the ROSGuard system will stop the robot if a
new stopping fault is detected. It would need to be recovered with new OVERRIDE
command to bring the multiplexer back into the slow movement state.
The request to override is constructed same as in the access reservation, but the
command is set to rosguard_msgs::access_request::OVERRIDE. The target is still
‘base’ which only includes the base actuators. The ‘collision_recovery_test’ has
only one output and it is on the base Twist controller multiplexer. The message is
published and figure 7.3 shows the resulting communication and actions.
Once the request is being progressed, the override command is immediately sent to
the multiplexer nodes as the override command does not execute checks like the other
commands. This shortens the normal turnaround for the messages to 0.7 seconds if
a second query to the multiplexer is not sent for conflicting resources. Otherwise the
response time doubles as new commands are sent to override other resources. The
multiplexer nodes on ‘base’ group change over to the ‘collision_recovery_test’ but
respond to the allocator that the existing controller ‘navigation’ has been overridden.
The nodes also send the previously reserved group name, torso_movement, in the
same message.
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As resources on the target of the override belong to a different group, it can mean that
the previous controller has lost some or all the control it has requested. Therefore
the execution of the controller may be incomplete once normal operation is resumed.
To prevent this the overriding controller is also given access to all the conflicting re-
sources. A OVERRIDE command is sent to the new group. This leads to the previous
controller losing all control over the resources it has reserved and it is forced out so it
cannot continue the execution. This is preventing possible issues with the controller
resuming execution with partial resources. The overriding controller does not have
outputs to the new resources on the torso_movement group, but they are locked at
zero movement as there is no input for the collision recovery. The allocator also pub-
lishes a response message with answer rosguard_msgs::access_response::OVERRIDE,
information of rosguard_msgs::access_response::OVERRIDDEN, the previous group
name, torso_movement, and the previous controller name, navigation. Once the
previous controller receives this message, it can adapt to the new situation. Overrides
can be issued even if the robot is moving, so overriding a resource shared on multiple
groups stops the movement on every actuator on the previously reserved group. The
controller cannot execute actions with only parts of the originally reserved actuators,
thus stopping a possibly hazardous movement.
The allocator receives the final response from the multiplexer nodes of the previous
group and ignores them. For a reserved group it is impossible to be partially reserved
and broken unless it is released improperly. If broken groups need to be able to be
taken over, the code has been left with comments to enable this feature to do more
Figure 7.3: Overriding resources with overlapping groups.
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in depth overrides. The overrides on multiplexers always change mode so there are
no further group conflicts to resolve. The overriding controller is notified with a
SUCCESS and OVERRIDDEN. In the info_text field the override is declared and
the need to use the ‘robot’ group for relieving the resource is advertised.
The OVERRIDE command always need to be freed with the global group "robot"
including all the multiplexer nodes due to the fact it may have reserved other resources
than the ones originally specified as targets. This decouples the controller from all
the resources, but it should not be an issue as the OVERRIDE command should only
be used to recover from faults. The overriding controller needs to be able to take
over the targeted resource no matter what state it is in. The additional resources
reserved outside the original target are locked to zero movement at the moment of
control change.
After releasing the resources, the multiplexer nodes are downgraded back into stopped
state as the fault has not been cleared. If the ‘collision_recovery_test’ has managed
to accomplish its goals, it may resolve the fault. If no other faults are present, the
multiplexer nodes are set into normal operation mode and the robot may continue
normal operation. Possibly the navigation may take the previously reserved resources
back and continue towards the navigation goal.
7.3 Access reservation library
Implementing the communication protocol for every controller could be tedious
and in most cases, where additional functionality of the detailed error messages
are not needed, the access reservation is most likely done by duplicating from the
existing examples. For roscpp applications a shared library was developed with some
additional functionality to ease the use of the ROSGuard access control. It can be
used by adding the rosguard_allocator package to the package.xml in build and run
dependencies. The header to be included is rosguard_allocator_request_lib.hpp
from the rosguard_allocator package.
Like other ROSGuard components, the name for the robot namespace needs to be
passed to the parent node utilizing the library with the ‘robot’ parameter. Configu-
ration of the controller name is not necessary as the library can extract the name of
the parent node. Therefore the controller name for the access control does not need
to be hardcoded and it can be redefined in the launch files by changing the name of
the node. The ROS node needs to be initialized in the code before the library object
is created for the library to function. The library does not run the initialization, but
creates the nodehandles if they are not created before the constructor is called [39].
By giving a name in the constructor, it is used instead of the current name of the
node for the control requests. This is useful if the controller name needs to be
static. The fixed naming also allows a single node to coordinate multiple clients
with differing control inputs, for example if a controller has normal operation mode
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and a special recovery mode in case of faults or a global planner is coordinating the
resource allocation separate from the executing controllers.
7.3.1 Library interface
The library provides four functions, each for the specified access request command,
which take the target of the command as the only parameter. The functions are
named the same as the commands: info, reserve, free and OVERRIDE. They
execute the specified command and return a boolean if the query was successful or
not. If the result of the query needs to be inspected, it can be extracted with the
getLastMessage() function returning a rosguard_msgs::access_resonse containing
the last message from the allocator.
The library also provides information on the overrides the controller has received
if it has been replaced. Function overridden() returns a boolean, which is true if
the controller has received a notice it has been replaced. Querying the function
also resets the value. To extract which target has been overridden, the message
containing the information is returned by getOverrideMessage(). It only returns the
last message containing the override information if there are multiple overrides for
the controller.
Finally the library provides threaded calls of the functions. Normally the functions
block the program execution until they receive response or time out after 60 seconds.
The threaded functions run the query in the background and other operations can
be executed in the foreground. The functions are postfixed with _NONBLOCK
and they return nothing. The return value is available after the receivedResponse_-
NONBLOCK() function returns true. The value is returned by the response_-
NONBLOCK() which behaves same as the blocking calls. These nonblocking calls
are useful for example when using ROS QT without threading and the UI needs
to be redrawn and responsive. Sending multiple requests with threaded calls is not
possible as the library waits for the response or the timeout before allowing new
commands to be passed through.
7.4 Future improvements
The lack of python library for easy access allocation leads to the need to duplicate
the callbacks for messages on the topics. The easier the system is to use, the more
likely it is used and currently there exists no ready codesamples for python. Using
the code from the C++ implementation as a base for the python version is easy for
the unthreaded example. The communication is done though ROS topics and there
are no non standard components used.
Integration of the access allocation into the multiplexer nodes could be seen as a
future improvement. The allocator is the only critical component running on a single
node. Offloading the allocation to the multiplexer nodes increases the complexity
46
without guaranteed benefits, but could lead to safer operation if the ROSGuard
system is developed to be more dynamic. Currently inputs for controllers cannot be
added without restarting the system, which is satisfactory for research purposes, but
not applicable if controllers need to be loaded dynamically. A possible workaround
is to configure every dynamic controller at launch, but depending on the number of
controllers it can lead to cluttered namespaces filled with automatically generated
input topics.
The C++ library cannot distinguish multiple calls from each other when receiving
notifications of overrides. Only the latest message from the allocator is stored,
therefore it is possible to discard the messages before they are processed. The current
functionality is sufficient for normal use, but may cause issues if complex reservations
are done. Building a queue inside the library should be possible if the complex
functionality is needed in the future.
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8 Firewall
As explained in section 3.1 the usage of a firewall was originally tested as an access
control implementation. During the testing it was observed that blocking individual
nodes from communicating with each other was possible. This was developed
into a separate firewall node for locking down the resources. The firewall is not
intended for security purposes to protect the robot from external threats, but to
work with ROS topics and their nodes to prevent accidental communications to the
specified topics, thus fulfilling the requirement 3. Usage of the firewall is optional
in the ROSGuard implementation. The firewall is not dependent on the rest of the
ROSGuard components apart from the messages so it can be used as standalone
solution to protect ROS topics.
The firewall node operates on the defined topics by monitoring the subscribers on the
local machine with the ROS slave API and then using the iptables to block network
communications from remote or local publishers to the local the subscriber. The
firewall cannot affect internal node communications defined as intraprocess publishing
[40] as it is outside the scope of the firewall capabilities. Starting and stopping of the
firewall has been made simple by not implementing a list of approved connections, but
the implementation requires the firewall to be started manually every time it is needed.
Upon starting the firewall all the connections to the defined topics are recorded and
kept connected, only new connections are blocked. This leads to easy configuration
of the firewall, but it is at the responsibility of the user to review the connections of
the topic. This can be easily achieved with ROS topic tools. The firewall is likely to
be used with the rest of the ROSGuard environment, therefore the firewall is best to
be configured only for the robot hardware resources where the accidental messages
are likely to be published by original code not using the ROSGuard components.
The hardware interfaces are also monitored by the multiplexers nodes, which inform
if there are multiple publishers on the topics. If these warnings are not present and
the firewall is activated for the topics, the hardware interfaces are essentially locked
down and only communicate through the multiplexers.
The original operation mode was to lock down the ongoing connections and then
block the slave API port on the subscriber node to prevent further communications
and new publishers to the node. This proved to be ideal solution for blocking access.
Blocking access to the slave API does not interfere with the normal operation of the
node on the ROS topics and the node continues to operate receiving messages from
the current publishers. This has been tested up to 24 hours of operation. As the
locked down mode does not allow any communication to the slave API, the node is
unable to receive default ROS service calls as they initiate new connection every time
they are called. Using persistent connection [32] for ROS services on the locked node
would circumvent this issue as the firewall allows the ongoing connections to stay
active. The other issue with locking down the slave API is the fact that the node no
longer receives calls from ROS Master, causing the shutdown signals to be ignored.
Blocking the ROS Master is deliberate as the negotiation between subscriber and
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publisher for a new connection is started by the subscriber once ROS Master informs
the subscriber of a new publisher [24].
A protected mode was later added to the firewall implementation to counter these
issues. In this mode the slave API is not blocked, the node can receive messages
from ROS Master and create new connections to other nodes. As a result the normal
ROS service calls works and the node responds to normal ROS events, such as ROS
master shutting down the node to prevent naming conflicts if a new node with same
name is created. The protected mode does suffer from a slow reaction time, where a
new publisher can connect to the subscriber and deliver messages before the firewall
can detect and block the communication. The firewall can be configured to publish a
fault message in case it detects a new publisher on a protected topic. In locked mode
the unapproved connections cannot be tracked as they cannot form in the first place.
If the publisher advertises but does not publish, the firewall in protected mode
is able to block the communication channel before any messages are published.
When the publisher sends out a message, the firewall rejects the data packet. This
happens only in the default operation modes with TCP connections. The ROSTCP
is retransmitting the message as the receiving end did not respond to the TCP
packets. This retransmission was also observed in the original firewall testing and
after 15 minutes the publisher node negotiates a new communication ports for the
message delivery. This renegotiation leads to the protected mode to constantly
poll the subscriber nodes for new unauthorized connections. ROSTCP is used for
internode communications unless the connection is marked as unreliable. In this
case the connection is using ROSUDP. As the firewall was built to secure down the
hardware resources on robot, the usage of UDP communications, where messages
can be dropped by connection errors, was deemed unlikely.
The locked mode is recommended if the subscriber node does not have ROS services
or they are unused. The possibility of accidental publishing to the subscriber is
minimal and the implementation is far more robust than the protected mode. The
locked mode also handles the blocking of unreliable connections as the publishers
cannot form the UDP connection in the first place. This also leads to the protection
of the ROS parameters on the hardware interface as they cannot be modified due to
the slave API being blocked.
8.1 Configuration
The topics the firewall nodes are monitoring are ROS parameters in the robot
namespace. The ROS parameters are set in protected_topics and locked_topics.
These are space separated listings of topic names in fully resolved format. The
topics are robot specific and are best to be loaded from separate configuration file.
Configuring the topics in launch files under each node is not recommended as it can
lead to desynchronization if robot configuration is updated. Topics can also be added
and removed by hand using the firewall controller user interface or by publishing
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directly to the firewall control topic. The control topic is shared between nodes and
each computer on the robot should have one firewall node.
The node configuration parameters include the updaterate, which is the polling
interval of the protected mode, and if the firewall is to send a fault on new connections
under the protected mode. At each polling interval the local subscribers are inquired
for new connections when the firewall is active. The timing is not guaranteed as
each connection to a subscriber node takes time and may fail. This update rate is
recommended to be set as low as possible if the protected mode is to be used. By
default this is set to one second. The faster new connections can be detected, the
better the firewall can protect the hardware resources. Setting this too low results
in the polling mode restarting immediately after the previous round has finished,
resulting in maximum polling rate. The second configuration item, which determines
if the firewall publishes a fault when it detects a new connection on a protected
topic, publishes a CHASSIS type fault with OUT_OF_CONTROL as description.
This reflects directly to the events where a new publisher is on the robot hardware
interface bypassing the multiplexer node. This feature is off by default.
8.2 Technical implementation
The following section details how the firewall operates from the initialization to
shutdown.
8.2.1 Initialization
As mentioned before, the firewall node is using iptables for blocking the message at
packet level. As iptables has no other interface apart from the iptables command
[41], the node needs to run as a superuser and execute the desired iptables command
on separate shell. Upon startup the firewall node checks if it running effectively as
a root, but also checks if the firewall is running as the root user. This due to the
fact that the firewall node is designed to be ran with the executable as effective root
with SUID bit set. If these conditions are not met, the firewall will output ROS error
message with the necessary commands, including path to the executable, to set the
SUID bit correctly. This setup allows the firewall nodes to run with root privileges
on any user when included in the launch files.
The firewall only affects the nodes running on local computer and therefore it needs
to determine local IP addresses and hostnames. These are acquired by going through
the network interfaces and extracting the IP addresses. During the testing on Care-
O-bot 4 this method was found out to cause segmentation faults and resulted in
the firewall crashing. The CAN driver creates interfaces that can be listed with
the network interfaces, but when checking if the interface is a network interface
it causes memory errors. This was prevented by excluding all interfaces starting
with letter C from the listing. With normal network naming standard, all normal
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network interfaces should be listed as they begin with either E, W or L for ethernet,
wireless and loopback. Fixed hostname localhost and IP 127.0.0.1 are also added to
the list along with the hostname given by gethostname function. The firewall node
will be identified by the hostname and it will be included in the console, rosout and
debug messages. After this the node creates and flushes the iptables chain named
ROS_TOPIC_CONTROL_IN and adds jump to the INPUT rulechain for this.
Now two timers are created for the node. The protectionTimer, which calls the
polling function going through the subscribers only when the firewall is enabled, and
debugTimer.
The debugTimer runs every five seconds and uses the ROS Master API [42] call
getSystemState() for acquiring the list of nodes on the system. The list of subscribers
is opened and then filtered by the topic name. Topics that do not match either the
ones in locked or protected list are ignored. If the topic is in the locked mode, all
the nodenames under the topic are added to the locked subscribers list. Likewise the
nodenames are added to the protected subscribers list if it is in the protected mode
list. These nodenames are sent to the ROS Master with the lookUpNode() call and
the acquired host and port are stored for the next step, but only if they reside on
the local computer. An unavoidable feature is that the system makes no checks if
the same node exists on both on locked and protected lists. The locked mode has
higher priority so any node that has protected and locked topics will always work in
locked mode.
The previously recorded host and port configurations of the target subscribers are
contacted with the getBusInfo() call of the Slave API. This gives all the connections
the target node has active. Connection details of the source and destination port,
host combination are stored along the topic name, subscriber nodename and the
operation mode on the topic.
8.2.2 Firewall startup, operation and shutdown
To ensure the listing us up to date, the debugTimer function is always executed before
the firewall is started. This updates the listing on connections, but it is marginally
faster and more reliable as it has all the connections older than five seconds already
stored. The connections used to acquire the information are not perfectly reliable.
Once the firewall is enabled, all the previously recorded host and port combinations
are iterated through. All source port to the corresponding destination port pairs are
explicitly allowed and the all other connection to the destination port are rejected
with icmp-admin-prohibited. During testing it was found out that the nodes ignore
REJECT hints so the connections can also be blocked with the DROP rule. Finally
the Slave API ports of the nodes with locked topics are locked down with the same
REJECT pattern. This is the end of operation for the topics in locked mode.
For nodes with topics in protected mode the protectionTimer calls the scanProtected
function of the firewall node. This function scans through the known nodes with
protected topics with the getBusInfo() Slave API call and compares the current
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connections of the protected topics against the list saved by the debugTimer, which
contains the active connections before firewall was enabled. A connection in the
current listing not found in previous connections is marked as a new connection.
This new connection is rejected with the source port and destination port with the
TCP packet having PUSH flag set. Blocking the PUSH messages means blocking
the data frames transferred through the ports, but ACK and other frames are still
passed between the nodes. For example if there is a publisher that is connected to a
subscriber, but not sending any data, the keepalive messages on the connection are
still working and from the publishers point of view everything is fine. Otherwise the
retransmission of the keepalive occurs and new connection is created as described
before. By having the keepalive working, the publisher starts the retransmission only
after publishing the first message. After the new iptables rule for the new connection is
executed, a debug message is sent in the firewall debug topic containing the connection
information. Additionally the firewall node publishes the OUT_OF_CONTROL
fault if so configured.
A new subscriber can be added to the system once firewall is running, but it may
not have had time to create necessary connections for proper operations. This is not
a problem as the configured topics are meant to be used for the hardware interfaces
on the robot. If the firewall is enabled, recording and monitoring the topics is
recommended to be done on separate computer without a firewall node to prevent
the firewall from interfering with the recording.
When the firewall is disabled or shut down, the iptables chain is flushed and all
recorded ports are cleared from the memory before the debugTimer starts recollecting
them. The node will automatically flush the chains even if it is shut down before
disabling the firewall.
8.3 Difficulties
When the system was being developed there were problems with the documentation
for the used components. The C++ implementation of the XMLRPC (Extensible
Markup Language Remote Procedure Call) used to communicate with ROS Master
and Slave API was lacking and required trial and error to extract the needed values.
The XmlRpcClient object used for communication was found to have bugs as it has
no configurable timeouts, although the functions were defined. In some cases the
calls to execute the desired command were left pending indefinitely. This resulted in
the need to thread the calling operations on the firewall node and the need to filter
out the locked Slave API ports to be never connected as a rejected connection also
caused the calls to hang forever.
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The launch files also include the firewall controller interface, which is launched inside
a detached GNU screen session on the base computer. To access the firewall interface
an ssh session to the base computer is needed. The command “screen -r firewall”
brings up firewall controller. The commands to set the firewall node run as a root
user need to be ran on the base computer only as the network filesystem is used to
attach the ROS workspaces on other computers. The current configuration allows the
SUID bit on mounted filesystems, but if this changes, the errors on firewall controller
will indicate if the firewall nodes are unable to execute the iptables commands on
the other computers.
The configured topics are all the hardware resources associated with the multiplexer
nodes. All the topics are in the protected mode of the firewall as the current
implementation needs the ROS services of the target nodes available. Initialization
and recovery of the hardware is done through these services and using the locked
mode would cause the current cob dashboard to be blocked from sending recovery
and initialization commands. Using the protected mode leads to the possibility of
commands going through to the protected topics for several messages before the
firewall detects the new communication and blocks them. If the dashboard is modified
to use persistent service connections or another node is developed to take care of
initialization and recovery, the topics can be changed to use the locked mode denying
access for any new publishers.
One known problem is the screen session not activating the ROS node of the interface
properly. Attaching the screen session wakes up the ROS node and it begins to work
normally. If the screen session is not attached, the node does not automatically
die if roslaunch is stopped or a ROS node with same name is created. These bugs
only affect the old control interfaces if the roslaunch including the controller is ran
multiple times. The latest controller spawned by roslaunch always works.
8.6 Future improvements
Currently the protected mode polls the subscriber nodes for new publishers and their
connection details periodically. The polling method is also sequential, which could
lead to delays and exceed the polling interval defined in the launch files. The polling
interval is already exceeded if a node fails to respond on the ROS slave API, which
happens occasionally as explained before. The delays and use of resources are not
ideal. The protected mode needs minor rework for proper implementation, but as
the protected mode was to be used for nodes with ROS services without persistent
connections, the implementation is adequate and works as intended.
To fix these issues the polling mode could be converted to only react to new publishers.
This would reduce the number of connections created to query the nodes for new
publishers, therefore reducing the frequency of failed connections. The sequential
nature of querying the nodes would also be removed, leading to faster operation.
Only the subscribing nodes associated with the topic for new publisher would be
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inquired for connection details with ROS slave API. The implementation should be
possible by using the ROS master API. ROS Master has information on nodes and
their subscribers, publishers, services and their topics. New publishers to a topic
inform the ROS Master of their connection details. Then the subscribers receive this
information from the ROS Master and connect to the slave API and negotiate direct
connections for delivering the topic message payload. This could be exploited by
creating a fake ROS node using the XMLRPC for subscribing into each protected
topic. The ROS Master will inform of new publishers to the fake node and the
information on topic, node and its ports are saved. Using this information the
subscriber nodes with the same topics could be queried for the connection details of
the new publisher. Then these new connections would be firewalled.
The connections to these topics still have to be checked periodically as in the original
polling mode 15 minutes after firewalling because a new port may have been negotiated
between the publisher and subscriber. After a new connection has been established,
it can be firewalled and the old port can be released. This is to be repeated every
time until the publisher is no longer advertising the topic. This solution is not ideal
as it still needs to poll the nodes, but it is faster than going through every subscriber.
Final improvement for the protected mode would be to include UDP connections
under the firewall. UDPROS communication is designated as “unreliable” in ROS
as it does not use TCP to ensure successful message delivery. As the firewall was
built to secure the hardware interfaces on robot, the UPD communication was
not a priority. As the UDPROS messages do not check for successful delivery, the
protected mode should not time out after 15 minutes. Using the UDP in protected
mode should therefore lead to less bleedthrough by the firewall as it does not create
new connections. This does not affect the locked mode as in locked mode the new
publishers cannot connect to the subscriber slave API port, this connection is always
performed with TCP transmissions.
All of the previous improvements have involved the protected mode of the firewall.
The mode was originally added for compatibility with normal ROS services without
persistent connections. Getting rid of the mode and making the locked mode work
in all situations would be ideal. This could be possible by using the firewall to
redirect the Slave API communications of the node from the ROS master to a filter.
The master informs the subscribers of new publishers and their topics. By filtering
the firewalled topics from the messages before relaying it back to the subscriber
node, the topics should be secure. This implementation allows the non firewalled
topics, services and other ROS functions, such as parameters, of the node to operate
normally.
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be refined with including a robot specific configuration for the grouping, but falling
back into original listing if none is loaded.
The possibility of adding a “clear all faults” button was considered. Adding it for
every robot could lead to issues as the operating environments of robots are vastly
different and the feature may see abuse if all faults are cleared every once in a while
instead of actually resolving the faults. A configuration option could be added to
turn the feature on and off.
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10.1 Example components
During the development the individual components were tested with scripted input
messages for interfaces and other components. The actions and outputs were verified,
but the interaction between the components needed to be tested. The simulation
environment for Care-O-bot was heavily used to test these combinations. Simple
test programs were developed to execute different actions on the platform to observe
and determine if the behaviour of the system was correct. These components can be
used as examples on how to construct different components for the system.
10.1.1 Cob4 base dummies
The base dummies are a collection of three controllers where each controller publishes
a twist message with different value on the angular Z axis, rotating the robot around
the base. The controllers utilize the access allocation for reserving the resources,
testing requirements 2 and 7. The outputs are routed to the inputs of the multiplexer
on the robot base, conforming to requirement 1. One of the controllers also includes
a randomized override so it can take over the resource even if it is not free at the
time, testing the requirement 8. All of the controllers can detect if they have been
overridden and stop the execution of the current action upon receiving the override
notification. However they do not utilize fault interface and will continue normal
operation regardless of fault messages. The difference between each controller is the
access reservation method.
The three possible examples are included in the codebase. First is the constructed
with manual subscriber and publisher to the access control topics and callback
function to monitor the response. This could be ported to Python without issues.
Second one is the usage of the access reservation library in the normal operation
mode for controlling the access requests. The final one is the example using the
threaded calls in the library for managing the access.
10.1.2 Arm collision monitor and resolver
The simulation environment spawns the robot in the default state and the arms of
the robot are extended to the sides with zero angle on the joints. If the arms are not
folded to the side of the robot, they will collide with the environment when the robot
is navigating near the walls. The built in collision avoidance by the laser scanners
on the velocity smoother only keeps the base of the robot from colliding with the
obstacles detected.
The arm collision monitor was built as an example fault monitor and it was used
to test the effects on faults on the simulated system where the robot is operating
autonomously. The constructed fault monitor reads the joint states of the arms. If
the joint angles are near zero, the arms are assumed to be in home position and the
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monitor is active for the relevant arm. As the majority of collisions affecting the arms
came from the walls on the simulated environment and they extend from the arm level
to the floor, the node is using the laser scanners on the floor level to detect the areas
under the arms. If it detects enough points in the monitored area, a configurable fault
is published, testing the requirements 5 and 6. The fault can stop the multiplexers
either with fast or slow stop, additionally the node can be configured to only publish
the fault without affecting the multiplexer states. The fault type is ENVIRONMENT
with COLLISION description. The severity is marked as ROBOT_HARM as the
collision could damage the arms or the grippers. The information on right and left
arm collision is encoded into the data field. The identifications of the published faults
are saved and the node will not publish new faults before the old ones are resolved.
The arm collision resolver is direct counterpart to the collision monitor and only
processes faults published by the monitor node. The resolver overrides the relevant
arm if no other controller has reserved it and folds the arm to the side of the robot.
The override enables the target actuators as by default the monitor node commands
the multiplexers to stop the robot and therefore test the requrement 8. The fault is
resolved once the arm has finished the commanded trajectory. If the arm is reserved
or cannot move and times out after 30 seconds, the fault is not resolved and the
resolver makes no further attempts to resolve the issue before new fault messages
are received. The node does not save the faults and the fault will be left active if the
resolver fails.
10.1.3 Navigating in the test environment
In a basic operation test the robot is spawned in default state into the ipa-apartment
[46] simulated environment. The ROSGuard environment is brought up from the
cob4_base_dummies package launch file base_nav_test.launch, which configures
the system. Controllers for the base and arms are defined for the base dummies and
the arm collision resolver. The base also includes a Twist proxy where the ROS
DWA (Dynamic Window Approach) planner included in the Care-O-bot codebase
is remapped to. The multiplexer on the base is directly connected to the hardware
command topic. The priority mux and the velocity smoother included by Fraunhofer
are bypassed so they do not interfere with the testing.
As the testing environment is brought up, the base dummies start reserving the twist
controller commanding the wheel actuators. They will spin the robot around for
seven to ten seconds before releasing the resource, at which point the other controllers
may take over. The cycle is continued indefinitely. Once a command is given through
the navigation goal for the DWA planner, it starts to output Twist messages for
the proxy. The proxy tries to reserve the resource and usually succeeds on first or
second time after the base has been released by a dummy controller. The proxy has
a delay when it tries to reserve after a failure and another controller may end up
taking the resource before the proxy can re-request the access. Once the proxy has
access, the DWA planner will drive the robot to the given goal position. Usually
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10.2 Use case examples
The examples on the robot use some of the components presented previously and
additionally a simple controller coordinating all the movements was developed. The
developed controller is configured from the launch file to reserve resources and execute
movement in linear fashion. The controller can react to faults by executing a specified
movement. Each time a movement is executed an access reservation is made. This
slows the controller down, but enables it to do override to recover from a fault. It
also recognizes if it has been overridden and aborts the execution. The controller is
named rosguard_playbacktest and the commands for the movements are pointed to
these inputs on the multiplexer nodes.
The controller takes five parameters which are linked together. First is the movement
command, either a ROS bag file or a shell script. The target group or topic of the
access reservation. The behavior of the access reservation, when to override and and
release the resources. Final two are the execution time of the movement before the
next one is enacted and the response to a fault for each movement. If no response
to fault is specified, the recovery is not done and the controller continues normal
execution. Originally the controller was supposed to only play recorded bag files,
but the actionservers used for arms made this impossible. The actionservers need
unique identifiers for the goalID parameter and during the bag playback the sequence
numbers of the actions are not the same as recorded. Using the rosbag to move the
arms was not practical so the controller was adopted to run shell scripts. For the
arms these scripts generate random goal identifiers and use rostopic to publish the
messages.
A set of launch files were added to bring up the ROSGuard system. Each actuator
group has its own launch file, which includes multiplexers for all the provided
hardware interfaces. These were gathered into two launch files consisting of the
whole system. These include the actuators and the supporting components. One
for the simulated environment and the other for real robot, where the nodes are
distributed across the computers available. The multiplexer grouping is defined
in the two main launch files, but the controller names are defined for the launch
file separately. The names are used to automatically generate the inputs for each
multiplexer. The desired configuration is defined in the experiment launch file, which
includes the ROSGuard system. Switching between the simulation and real robot is
straightforward and is done by changing between the two the included launch files
sim.launch and robot.launch. An example configuration for launch file is shown in
figure 10.3.
As the system was designed to be easy to use, the steps for adding controllers to the
system needed to be minimal. The insertion of a controller can be achieved with
three steps if the controller outputs the message types supported by the ROSGuard
and robot. First the controller is assigned a name and it is added to the relevant
hardware groups as an input controller. Second the outputs of the controller must be
mapped to match the inputs generated for the controller. Last the controller must
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During the uninterrupted runs the controller successfully executes the serving of tea,
testing the requirements 1 and 2. Publishing acceleration faults with the HTTP
interface causes the controller to abort the pour and the pot is brought level for
testing the requirement 8. During the pouring stage while the pot is tilted the
controller has been configured to reserve the whole robot so moving other actuators
does not disturb the ongoing task. Trying to reserve the base with override using
the “navigation” controller resulted in the control to be passed over to the overriding
controller. The teapot was left in the pouring orientation as the playback controller
no longer had access to the arm and had aborted the execution. This is the intended
result as the overriding controller took over the group in the base of the robot and
the playback was aborted as it had lost access to the needed resources. As stated
before, the overriding controllers must be able to take over the robot in unknown,
possibly hazardous state. The requirements 7 and 8 were fulfilled as the “navigation”
had authorization to use overrides for the fault recovery, which in this case was faked.
Once faults configured with messages to stop the robot were published, the observa-
tions between the real robot and the simulation started to diverge. If the arms were
in motion while the faults were published, the multiplexers cancelled the current
goals executing on the arm. In simulation this only resulted in the arm stopping
all movement. On the real robot the sudden stop of the actuators caused hardware
errors and the actuators were disabled. Issuing the recover commands from the
cob_command_gui [49] re-enabled the actuators and they could be operated again.
The faults from the arm actuators also appeared in the HTTP fault monitor listing
as the diagnostics to fault node automatically translated them. The same also occurs
Figure 10.4: The robot pouring tea from simulated teapot.
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if the override is issued during the motion as the multiplexers do not allow moving
actuators to be passed for other controllers. In figure 10.5 the robot has cancelled
the pour as a human has entered the operational area. The door arm monitor was
used to detect the object, the foot, under the arm.
Other issues during the real robot testing were caused by assumptions in the de-
velopment phase. The firewall and CAN interface incompatibility was discovered
as soon as the tests were started on the real robot. The firewall nodes running on
computers with CAN interfaces would crash immediately at system launch. The
firewalls would also disregard some nodes as the hostname did not initially match
the local machine. The base ROS system running the robot is started at boot and
the network connections have not yet formed. Once all the computers have booted
and connected, the new nodes spawned on the computers may receive different
hostname used in the XMLRPC communication. This was fixed and now the firewall
nodes extract all addresses used by the local system. The final issue caused by the
assumptions were the automatically generated node names. ROS does not allow
nodes to have certain special characters in the names and some of the ROSGuard
components used the computer hostname to automatically name themselves if no
names were specified for the node. The computer hostnames included forbidden
characters and the code was modified to filter the special characters so the name
generation would work.
Initially the demonstrations would not run on the real robot at all as the resource
allocator rejected the access requests sent from the demonstration controllers. The
Figure 10.5: Tea pouring aborted due to interference.
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requests were expired. The fault was not found on the developed system, but on the
robot itself. The clocks on the robot were not synchronized and were 140 seconds
apart at worst. The ROS environment on the Care-O-bot is spread across six different
computers. The grippers include two more, but they are not connected to the ROS
environment and only accept commands for operating the grippers. As the testing
was started, the robot had not been used for other applications as it had been recently
delivered. The robot was connected to the Intelligent robotics VLAN (Virtual Local
Area Network), which includes the laboratories and the personnel offices. Restrictions
have been applied on it so no outside connections can be used to affect the computers
in the network. This setup also blocks the NTP (Network Time Protocol) from
operating on any other time server than the ones provided by the Aalto University
network services. The robot was misconfigured as it was set to only use German
NTP servers. A local server had been configured so the clocks would synchronize
internally on the robot, but it was disabled and did not work when enabled. As the
robot could no longer connect to the German servers and the internal synchronization
was defective, the clocks started to drift. This caused the issue with expired access
requests. The issue was fixed by configuring a server on the base computer of the
robot to be used as a primary NTP server for the other computers and the Aalto
server as secondary. As the robot is started the base computer is not immediately
used for the clock signal as NTP server does not allow the time to be served before
the clock has stabilized. This issue also indicates that the ROSGuard system cannot
handle significant changes in the system clock as the ROS time is used for calculating
the velocity and acceleration limits. With working NTP setup this is not an issue.
The pour demonstration yielded the desired outcome by exposing the difference
between the simulation environment and the real robot. The playback controller is
able to pour the tea and react to the external stimulation inserted into the system.
This example only covers some of the hazards that may occur during the operation
of the robot, mainly the spillage of hot water and the operator getting too close to
the robot. Other hazards to be monitored could be the overflow of the cup and the
attachment of the pot to the robot failing. Even pressing the E-Stop on the robot
could lead to the hot water to be left flowing causing further injuries and by that
assumption it would be safer to let the controller recover to the non-pouring state
before an emergency stop is issued. This causes issues with the safety standards as
they require the E-Stop to be activated in certain situations, where leaving the robot
actuators at the current orientation may lead to further harm. This was also noted
by other studies on robot safety [35]. This could be avoided by the requirement
of the inherently safe design required by the ISO 13482:2014, but as a personal
care robot the task required by the end user may be too generic in nature to be
safely designed. The personal care robot may be asked to fetch or pick up items
for the end user and these items could be inherently dangerous for the robot or the
user. Requiring the robot to only interact with objects it recognizes could limit the
usability to unsatisfactory levels. The broader the functionality the consumer robot
is, the more likely it is to be integrated into everyday use as the users do not need
to adopt their behaviour or environment too dramatically. Historical studies have
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proved this [50]. The processing power, perception and artifical intelligence have
advanced and it could be possible for the robot to determine the safest action to
execute with further reasearch.
The hazards after the liquid has spilled should also be addressed. An environmental
warning may be issued through the faults and logged. Addressing the issue may be
left to a controller responsible of cleaning the residence. If a human is harmed due
to the spillage, the fault should be flagged with the HUMAN_HARM severity. If
the robot is a remote caretaker [51], the messages may be passed to the supervising
party, who could take over the robot in teleoperation to observe the issue and alert
the relevant parties if the client needs help.
10.2.2 The robot opens a water tap
A possible example on how to use pending faults is presented in this use case. The
example was not executed on a real robot as the fault messages are faked and the
robot does not perform actual movements.
The robot was instructed to open an irrigation system for watering the lawn in the
backyard and leave it running for an hour. During this time the robot should to
continue cleaning the house, which was the second most requested feature in the 2011
study [47]. During the cleaning the robot collided with a floor lamp, which fell over
and confined the robot into the room it was cleaning. The robot was unable to close
the irrigation system, resulting in over watering the plants and increased water bills.
The controller responsible of directing the robot should recognize that the command
it was asked to do was for a specified time. The planner queued both tasks, the
opening and closing according to the instructions received. Once the task for opening
the valve come up, the robot published a pending fault for the possible environmental
hazard. The fault was timed for the one hour with ten minutes added for the possible
delays from task switching and travel times. Then the robot opened the irrigation
system and returned to the previous task, which was cleaning the house. Note that
the fault must be published before the action leading to possible hazard is taken
to ensure the sending does not fail if the controller crashes as it is opening the tap.
Even if the controller crashes after publishing the pending fault, but before opening
the tap, the controller fails in a safe manner.
The robot continued cleaning, but as it was leaving one of the bedrooms it could not
get out as a lamp had fallen over blocking the doorway. The navigation controller
tried to find an alternate route out of the room, but failed. As the navigation could
not reach the desired goal, it notified the other components it was stuck. This
was then tried to be resolved by contacting the owners in the house by the speech
interface. The owners were not inside the house so the robot was still stuck. The
robot being confined into a room is not considered a hazardous condition so the
supervising party, possibly external service sold along the robot or a cloud based
interface for the owner, was not contacted.
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As the navigation cannot find a route out of the room, the queued task for closing the
irrigation system was left in the task queue. However once the timed environmental
hazard fault was published, the robot tried again using the speech interface to warn
the owners. As the robot received no replies, it activated the connection to the
supervising party as the hazard was deemed considerable enough for the service to
be used. The owner was notified of the event and decides the proper course of action.
This is a test for the requirement 8 where the faults are not the direct result of the
current action.
This again brings out the question if an autonomous robot should execute tasks,
which may lead to environmental or other hazards. Again this could be avoided by the
inherently safe design by using a solenoid valve controlled by the home automation
system. However operating a lever, the water tap, is a task the robot should be
capable of as the difference between door latches, which the robot should be able to
operate, and the tap is not extreme. Again the same issue presented in the previous
example emerges. The end users do not want to modify their environment more than
necessary and this could lead to tasks which may be hazardous.
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11 Conclusions
In this thesis a system for interfacing multiple controllers for robot hardware with
additional fault tolerance was introduced and implemented. The system is intended
to prevent the unintentional motions from happening on personal care robots when
the robot is working with multiple controllers dedicated for executing different tasks.
An error in a controller can lead to situations where it commands motions when
the connected actuators need to be stationary or a controller can command zero
movement in a waiting state while another controller is trying to execute tasks. These
motions could endanger the robot, environment or humans interacting with the robot,
which goes against the current safety standards for human and robot interaction.
The system cannot replace the conventional methods for ensuring the safety for
humans, environment or itself. The active controllers on the robot can still command
the actuators according to their programming, which may or may not be faulty.
This problem can be mitigated by the secondary requirements set for the system.
The ability to slow down or stop the robot independently from the ongoing actions
provide the system designer with tools for protecting the robot, environment and
interacting personnel from harm.
The configurable velocity and acceleration limits also provide active protection in
case the actuators are commanded to move too fast compared to the safe operating
limits. This functionality may cause issues if coordinated movements are executed
between two robots with different limits. The events are recorded and logged so the
user can adopt the misconfigured software to comply within the safe operating limits.
The previously presented functionality is executed by the multiplexer nodes. As long
as the software is configured to use the proper topics, the input switching is robust and
does not allow unauthorized controllers to communicate with the hardware interface.
This can however be bypassed by publishing directly into topics or actionservers
provided by the hardware. This misconfiguration is also reported and logged so the
users may fix the issues. This hazard can be reduced further by using the included
firewall functionality for ensuring the access to the hardware interface cannot be used
by any other node. Combining these two improves the fault tolerance of the robot as
accidental and even malicious publishing to the hardware interface can be prevented.
The previously mentioned slowdown functionality is not perfect as discussed in the
multiplexer implementation. The safety related speed control cannot actively slow
down the ongoing motions on all of the provided message types when the system
is commanded to slow down and the requirement 6 is not fully achieved. Only the
messages with continuous command data work as intended. The event type messages,
such as the FollowJointTrajectory, were investigated and had partially implemented
functionality, before they were rejected. The slowdown functionality could not be
reliable in every situation. Instead the interfaces complete the current motions with
the old velocity and acceleration limits and the slower motions are only applied for
new commands passed through the multiplexer nodes. To fix this more work needs
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to be applied to the multiplexers with event based messages. However as recognized
in the multiplexer section, the return on investment for the rework is not guaranteed
and it requires more resources from the host system to operate correctly. The current
implementations do not consume resources and response times are minimal for the
event message based nodes.
To keep the resource consumption low, the velocity limits are only applied for joint
angles. No forward kinematics are performed for the joint-chains and some interfaces
do not even have feedback from the actuators. This may lead to the end effector
exceeding the velocity limits, conflicting with the requirement 4. As mentioned in the
multiplexer section this was seen to be excessive as the velocity limiting was added
to catch extreme or badly misconfigured movements from passing into the hardware.
The real protection should be executed by the fault monitors. These events are also
reported and logged for the user so the issue can be resolved at the controller level.
Resource allocator provides the required services for the client controllers to request
and relieve resources. It is easy to use and robust as it does not rely on internal
memory to store the current state of the system. Querying the multiplexer nodes
each time for normal queries slows down the response times for access requests, but
the 1.5 seconds for a normal successful query was deemed acceptable as it is only
done during control changes. Naturally the figure starts doubling when there are
other requests queried on the system. The allocator processes only one request at a
time. The override functionality provides the needed tool for recovering the robot
from fault states. Using the normal methods only the controller on the resource can
relieve it. When using the overrides the resources are handed over to the requesting
controller and the original one is notified of the lost resources. The override also
takes care of allocating any overlapping group that has been reserved on the nodes
of the overridden target. This improves the safety of the system as a controller is not
allowed to continue execution on the resource that may have been partially taken
over by the overriding controller.
Overrides are intended to be used to resolve faults in the system. The provided
functionality for the faults is simplified to a single message on a topic any of the
components on the robot may connect to. Using dedicated monitoring components
to detect and identify faults in the system, the information can be passed to other
components. These may resolve the fault or forward it to the relevant party for
inspection. The message also controls the multiplexer states slowing down the robot
with the safety-related speed control or stop it with the protective stop. This is a
category 2 stop state and it can be automatically resolved if the autonomous layer
of the robot determines the fault to be safely recoverable. The thesis does not take
account on how this could be done, but provides the functionality for executing the
needed actions in practical manner. A possible method suitable for the system is
referenced, but the full implementation did not belong into the scope of this thesis.
These faults can be monitored and manipulated from the HTTP interface. The faults
are listed and color coded based on the actions the multiplexers take when the faults
are received. This makes the identification of faults stopping or slowing down the
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system effortless. The interface was also designated as the software E-Stop and it can
be used from any computer or mobile phone connected to the same network as the
robot. For researching the effects of simulated faults on the system the interface also
includes the possibility of publishing faults from the interface. The same interface is
also used to inspect the messages from the multiplexer nodes stated earlier. These
are also color coded so different errors can be easily filtered from the listing. The
interface is not perfect as only the numerical values of messages are used to denote
the values instead of the human readable enumerations. As a secondary feature, the
monitoring interface accomplishes the tasks required by showing and modifying the
faults.
The testing on the actual Care-O-bot 4 proved the ROSGuard system to behave as
in the simulated robot. The main issue on the real robot operation are the hardware
faults. During the testing it was found out that if the arms were stopped from motion
by the multiplexers, the robot hardware would issue faults on the joint actuators. In
the simulated environment this did not occur and the only faults in the diagnostics
were errors from faulty simulated 3d cameras on the torso. This combined with the
observations on the firewall led to the problem that in certain modes the firewall
would prevent the recovery functions on the hardware. In locked mode the firewall
prohibits ROS service connections from forming on the nodes with the targeted
topics. As a result the recovery commands using these services could not be issued
to the hardware with locked topics. This was resolved by adding the protected mode
into the firewall where the service connections were able to form.
The protected mode of the firewall is a stopgap solution for the problem with service
connections. As discussed in the firewall section it is not perfect as it operates on
polling principle and only updates the internode connection map periodically. This
allows the publishers to deliver the message to the subscribers if the message is
delivered in the timeframe the publisher has started advertising to the topic, but the
firewall has not yet detected the connection. Workarounds for the issue are provided
by using the persistent service connections, but the proper solution needs a complete
rewrite how the firewall operates on protecting the subscriber nodes.
The testing on the selected use cases also brought out issues on the current safety
standards. The standards require the motions of the robot to be stopped immediately
using the emergency stop. In the selected case this could lead to further harm for the
human interacting with the robot as stopping of the robot does not stop the hazard,
but instead causes additional damages. When the robot is allowed to recover from
the fault causing the hazards the risk of injury is decreased, assuming the recovery
method was the correct response. The inherently safe design of the platform and
tasks could limit the usability of the robot to levels, which could be unacceptable for
normal user. The risk identification and assessment is critical for determining which
actions the robot may take and to minimize the risks.
In conclusion the ROSGuard system presented meets the main requirements for it,
the controller separation executed by the robust multiplexers. No error messages
are generated by the components, when the system is configured properly as it
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instructs the users on configuration of the system. The secondary requirements are
also achieved to an agreeable level, not every interface provides the full functionality.
The ease of use should also fulfill the requirements for the Intelligent robotics group,
but it remains to be seen as the system is not yet in everyday use and the presented
code examples are only for C/C++
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